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Abstract 
 
Seven possible nominal variables are considered as candidates to be the anchor or target 
for monetary policy.  The context is countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), which tend to be price takers on world markets, to produce commodity exports 
subject to volatile terms of trade, and to experience procyclical international finance.  
Three anchor candidates are exchange rate pegs:  to the dollar, euro and SDR.     One 
candidate is orthodox Inflation Targeting.  Three candidates represent proposals for a 
new sort of inflation targeting that differs from the usual focus on the CPI, in that prices 
of export commodities are given substantial weight and prices of imports are not:  PEP 
(Peg the Export Price), PEPI (Peg an Export Price Index), and PPT  (Product Price 
Targeting).  The selling point of these production-based price indices is that each could 
serve as a nominal anchor while yet accommodating terms of trade shocks, in comparison 
to a CPI target.  CPI-targeters such as Brazil, Chile, and Peru are observed to respond to 
increases in world prices of imported oil with monetary policy that is sufficiently tight to 
appreciate their currencies, an undesirable property, which is the opposite of 
accommodating the terms of trade.  As hypothesized, a product price target generally 
does a better job of stabilizing the real domestic prices of tradable goods than does a CPI 
target.  Bottom line: A Product Price Targeter would appreciate in response to an increase 
in world prices of its commodity exports, not in response to an increase in world prices of 
its imports.  CPI targeting gets this backwards. 
 
JEL classifications: E5, F4. 
 
Key words: money, nominal anchor, peg, terms of trade, agricultural commodities, 
Inflation Targeting, Peg the Export Price, Product Price Targeting, CPI target, mineral 
commodities, gold, Latin America.   2
 A Comparison of Monetary Anchor Options, Including Product 
Price Targeting, for Commodity-Exporters in Latin America 
 
 
 
1. Introduction:   The Evolution of Nominal Targets for 
Monetary Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
In perhaps no other region have attitudes with respect to nominal anchors for 
monetary policy evolved more than in the developing countries of the Western 
Hemisphere.    
Inflation rates went very high in the early 1980s, to hyperinflation in some cases 
(including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Nicaragua).  As a result, the need for a nominal 
anchor was plain to see.   In a non-stochastic model, any nominal variable is as good a 
choice for monetary anchor as any other nominal variable.  But in a stochastic model, not 
to mention the real world, it makes quite a difference what is the nominal variable toward 
which the monetary authorities publicly commit in advance.
 1     Should it be the money 
supply?   Exchange rate?   CPI?   Other alternatives?   That question is the subject of this 
paper. 
When stabilization was finally achieved in the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC), in the 1980s and early 1990s, the exchange rate was virtually always 
the nominal anchor around which the successful stabilization programs were built, 
whether it was Chile’s tablita, Bolivia’s exchange rate target, Argentina’s convertibility 
plan, or Brazil’s real plan.   But matters have continued to evolve. 
 
1.1 The trend from exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting 
 
The series of emerging market currency crises that began in Mexico in December 
1994 and ended in Argentina in January 2002 all involved the abandonment of exchange 
rate targets, in favor of more flexible currency regimes, if not outright floating.   In many 
countries, the abandonment of a cherished exchange rate anchor for monetary policy took 
place under the urgent circumstances of a speculative attack (including Mexico and 
Argentina).   A few countries made the jump to floating preemptively, before a currency 
crisis could hit (Chile and Colombia).    Only a very few smaller countries responded to 
the ever rougher seas of international financial markets by moving the opposite direction, 
to full dollarization (Ecuador, under pressure of crisis; and El Salvador, out of longer-run 
motivations).    On a 30-year time span, the general trend has been toward increased 
flexibility.
2   
                                                 
1 The best reference for this familiar point is Rogoff (1985).     Two appendices there demonstrate that the 
choice of nominal target makes a big difference in the presence of shocks.    
2 Collins (1996).   The co-existence of floating, on the one hand, and currency boards and dollarization, on 
the other, gave rise in the late 1990s to the hypothesis that emerging market countries could go to either the 
floating corner or the institutionally fixed corner, but that intermediate exchange rate regimes such as 
basket pegs or target zones were no longer viable.    This “corners hypothesis” subsequently fell largely out 
of fashion, as one could have predicted.   Frankel (2004).     3
 
With exchange rate targets somewhat out of favor by the end of the 1990s, and the 
gold standard and monetarism
3 having been already relegated to the scrap heap of history, 
there was a clear vacancy for the position of preferred nominal anchor, or intermediate 
target for monetary policy.  [The table in Appendix I summarizes, with historical 
examples, the Achilles heel or vulnerability of monetarism, the gold standard, and each of 
the other variables that have been proposed as candidates for nominal target.]     
The regime of Inflation Targeting (IT) was a fresh young face, coming with an 
already-impressive resume of recent successes in wealthier countries (New Zealand, 
Canada, United Kingdom, and Sweden).    In many emerging market countries around the 
world, IT got the job of preferred nominal anchor.   Three South American countries 
officially adopted Inflation Targeting in 1999, in place of exchange rate targets:  Brazil, 
Chile, and Colombia.
4  Mexico had done so earlier, after the peso crisis of 1994-95.   
Peru followed suit in 2002, switching from an official regime of money targeting.  
Guatemala has officially entered a period of transition to inflation targeting, under a law 
passed in 2002.   
In many ways, Inflation Targeting has functioned well.    It apparently anchored 
expectations and avoided a return to inflation in Brazil, for example, despite two severe 
challenges: the 50% depreciation of early 1999, as the country exited from the real plan, 
and the similarly large depreciation of 2002, when a presidential candidate who at the 
time was considered anti-market and inflationary pulled ahead in the polls.
5   
 
One could argue, however, that events of recent years, particularly the global 
financial crisis of 2008-2009, have put strains on the Inflation Targeting regime much as 
the events of 1994-2001 had earlier put strains on the regime of exchange rate targeting.    
Three other kinds of nominal variables have forced their way into the attentions of central 
bankers, beyond the CPI.   One nominal variable, the exchange rate, never really left – 
certainly not for the smaller countries.    A second category of nominal variable, asset 
prices, has been the most relevant in the last few years in industrialized countries.     The 
international financial upheaval that began in mid-2007 with the US sub-prime mortgage 
crisis has forced central bankers to re-think their intent focus on inflation, to the 
exclusion of equity and real estate prices.    But a third category, prices of agricultural 
and mineral products, is particularly relevant for countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  The greatly heightened volatility of commodity prices has resurrected 
arguments about the desirability of a currency regime that accommodates terms of trade 
shocks.    This third challenge to CPI-targeting is the main focus of this study.  
 
                                                 
3 Enthusiasm for monetarism had largely died out by the mid-1980s, perhaps because M1 targets had 
recently proven unrealistically restrictive in the largest industrialized countries.   A surprising number of 
LAC countries continue officially to list money supply as their anchoring variable (Argentina, Guyana, 
Jamaica, and Uruguay).  But one may doubt in practice how strictly they try to keep any monetary 
aggregate within declared ranges. 
 
4  Chile had begun to set inflation targets in 1991, but had also followed a basket peg exchange rate target 
throughout the 1990s.   Mishkin (2008) discusses the examples of Chile and Brazil. 
 
5  Giavazzi, Goldfajn, and Herrera (2005).     4
1.2 Roadmap for the paper 
 
This paper weighs the advantages of major competing monetary regimes.  The 
context is countries, such as those in Latin America and the Caribbean, that tend to be 
price takers on world markets, to produce commodity exports subject to volatile terms of 
trade, and to lack countercyclical international finance.  Section 2 elaborates on the 
Inflation Targeting regime, some drawbacks that it has encountered as a result of 
focusing on the CPI, and some proposed alternative versions that focus on production-
oriented price indices instead.  The selling point of a production-based price index is it 
could serve as a nominal anchor while yet accommodating terms of trade shocks, in 
comparison to a CPI target.  Section 3 is a simple theoretical model, in the mode of 
Rogoff (1985), to illustrate the comparison among exchange rate targeting, CPI targeting, 
and the alternative of a product-price target. 
Section 4, the heart of the paper, is a counterfactual statistical analysis.   Seven 
possible nominal variables are considered as candidates to be the anchor or target for 
monetary policy.  Three anchor candidates are exchange rate pegs:  to the dollar, euro and 
SDR.     One candidate is orthodox Inflation Targeting.  Three candidates represent the 
proposals for a new sort of inflation targeting that differs from the usual focus on the CPI, 
in that prices of export commodities are given substantial weight and prices of imports 
are not:  PEP (Peg the Export Price), PEPI (Peg an Export Price Index), and PPT  
(Product Price Targeting).  Unsurprisingly all seven nominal anchors deliver greater 
overall nominal price stability in our simulations than the inflationary historical monetary 
regimes actually followed by LAC countries (with the exception of Panama). A dollar 
peg does not particularly stabilize domestic commodity prices.  The key finding is that, as 
hypothesized, a product price target generally does a better job of stabilizing the real 
domestic prices of tradable goods than does a CPI target.  Bottom line: A Product Price 
Targeter would appreciate in response to an increase in world prices of its commodity 
exports, not in response to an increase in world prices of its imports.  CPI targeting gets 
this backwards. 
 
 
2. Problems with Inflation Targeting 
 
Inflation targeting has sometimes been defined very broadly:  “the monetary 
authorities choose a long run goal for inflation and act transparently.”
 6  But usually 
something more specific is implied by the term.    For one thing, the price target is 
virtually always the Consumer Price Index (though sometimes “core” rather than 
“headline” CPI).     The contribution of this paper is to consider other price indices that 
are possible alternatives to the CPI for the role of nominal anchor, within what could still 
be called Inflation Targeting. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Among many references in the large literature on inflation targeting, three that are internationally oriented 
are: Svensson (1995); Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999); and Truman (2003).      5
2.1 What, exactly, is meant by Inflation Targeting? 
 
 
The narrow definition of inflation targeting would have the central bank governor 
committing each year to a goal for the CPI over the course of the coming year, and then 
putting 100% weight on achieving that objective to the exclusion of all others.    Some 
proponents make clear that they are talking about something broader than this:   flexible 
inflation targeting, under which the central bank puts some weight on the output objective 
rather than everything on the inflation objective – as in a Taylor Rule -- over the one-year 
horizon.  This study will not deal especially with the eternal question of how much 
weight should be placed in the short term on a nominal anchor, such as a price index, 
relative to real output; nor with the question of how much discretion a central bank 
should be allowed, as opposed to strict adherence to a rule.    The central focus will, 
rather, be on another specific question:  to whatever extent weight is to be placed on a 
nominal anchor -- whether it is 100% as under a fixed exchange rate, or a more flexible 
range – what are the advantages and disadvantages of various nominal anchors? 
 
2.2 What is different about Latin American economies?  Low credibility, procyclical 
finance, supply shocks, and terms of trade volatility 
 
  Which regimes are most suitable for countries in the region? Table 1 reports the 
exchange rate and monetary regimes currently followed officially by 18 LAC countries.   
Inflation, the exchange rate, and the money supply are all represented among their 
choices of targets.
7   We begin with a consideration of some structural characteristics that 
tend to differentiate these countries from others, though it is important to acknowledge 
heterogeneity within the region. 
  Studies of monetary policy in developing or emerging-market countries, and of 
inflation targeting in particular, make the point that they tend to have less developed 
institutions and lower central bank credibility than industrialized countries.
 8    Lower 
central bank credibility usually stems from a history of price instability, which in turn is 
attributable in part to past reliance on seignorage in the absence of a well-developed 
fiscal system.   Another common feature is an uncompetitive banking system, which is 
again in part attributable to a public finance problem: a traditional reliance on the banks 
as a source of finance, through a combination of financial repression and controls on 
capital outflows.     These countries also have higher default risk, of course, which is one 
aspect of imperfect financial markets.      
 
                                                 
7 Mishkin and  Savastano (2002).   
8 E.g., Fraga, Goldafjn and Minella (2003). 
   6
 
Table 1:   LAC Countries’ Current Regimes and Monthly Correlations  
of Exchange Rate Changes ($/local currency) with Dollar Import Price Changes        
Note: Import price changes are changes in the dollar price of oil. 
   Exchange Rate Regime  Monetary Policy  1970‐1999  2000‐2008  1970‐2008 
ARG  Managed floating  Monetary aggregate target  ‐0.0212  ‐0.0591  ‐0.0266 
BOL 
Other conventional fixed peg 
arrangements  Against a single currency  ‐0.0139  0.0156  ‐0.0057 
BRA  Independently floating  Inflation targeting framework (1999)  0.0366  0.0961  0.0551 
CHL  Independently floating  Inflation targeting framework (1990)*  ‐0.0695  0.0524  ‐0.0484 
CRI  Crawling pegs  Exchange rate anchor  0.0123  ‐0.0327  0.0076 
GTM  Managed floating  Inflation targeting framework  ‐0.0029  0.2428  0.0149 
GUY 
Other conventional fixed peg 
arrangements  Monetary aggregate target  ‐0.0335  0.0119  ‐0.0274 
HND 
Other conventional fixed peg 
arrangements  Against a single currency  ‐0.0203  ‐0.0734  ‐0.0176 
JAM  Managed floating  Monetary aggregate target  0.0257  0.2672  0.0417 
NIC  Crawling pegs  Exchange rate anchor  ‐0.0644  0.0324  ‐0.0412 
PER  Managed floating  Inflation targeting framework (2002)  ‐0.3138  0.1895  ‐0.2015 
PRY  Managed floating 
 The country has an IMF‐supported or 
other monetary program  ‐0.023  0.3424  0.0543 
SLV  Dollar  Exchange rate anchor  0.1040  0.0530  0.0862 
URY  Managed floating  Monetary aggregate target  0.0438  0.1168  0.0564 
                 
Oil Exporters             
   Exchange Rate Regime  Monetary Policy  1970‐1999  2000‐2008  1970‐2008 
COL  Managed floating  Inflation targeting framework (1999)  ‐0.0297  0.0489  0.0046 
MEX  Independently floating  Inflation targeting framework (1995)  0.1070  0.1619  0.1086 
TTO 
Other conventional fixed peg 
arrangements  Against a single currency  0.0698  0.2025  0.0698 
VEN 
Other conventional fixed peg 
arrangements  Against a single currency  ‐0.0521  0.0064  ‐0.0382 
                 
* Chile proclaimed an inflation target as early as 1990; nevertheless, it had an exchange rate target, under an explicit band‐
basket‐crawl regime, until 1999.  
Source: IMF De Facto Classifications of Exchange Rate regimes and Monetary Policy approach.      
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2006/eng/0706.htm 
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  The standardly drawn implications of underdeveloped institutions and low 
inflation-fighting credibility are that it is particularly important (i) that their central banks 
have independence
9 and (ii) that they make regular public commitments to a transparent 
and monitorable nominal target.   Some Latin American countries have given their central 
banks legal independence, beginning with Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela in 
the 1990s.
10  Sure enough,  Jácome (2001), Gutiérez (2003) and  Jácome and Vázquez 
(2008) find a negative statistical relationship between central bank independence and 
inflation among LAC countries.   There are also some skeptics, however, who argue that 
central bank independence won’t be helpful if a country’s political economy dictates 
budget deficits regardless of monetary policy. 
11  
  The principle of commitment to a nominal anchor in itself says nothing about 
what economic variables are best suited to play that role.    Public promises to hit targets 
that cannot usually be fulfilled subsequently will do little to establish credibility.
12 
Most analysis of inflation targeting is more suited to large industrialized countries 
than to small developing countries, in several respects.
13   First, the theoretical models 
usually do not feature a role for exogenous shocks in trade conditions or difficulties in the 
external accounts.      The theories tend to assume that countries need not worry about 
financing trade deficits internationally.  Many assume that international capital markets 
function well enough to smooth consumption in the face of external shocks.
14   In reality, 
however, financial market imperfections are serious for developing countries.
15  
International capital flows do not tend to moderate external shocks, to smooth 
consumption or to optimize intertemporally.   Booms -- featuring capital inflows, 
excessive currency overvaluation and associated current account deficits -- are often 
followed by busts, featuring sudden stops in inflows, abrupt depreciation, and recession.
16   
An analysis of monetary policy that did not take into account the international financial 
                                                 
9 E.g., Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2002). 
 
10 Junguito and Vargas (1996) and Anone, Laurens and Segalotto (2006). 
 
11 Mas (1995). 
 
12  The Bundesbank had enough credibility that a record of proclaiming M1 targets and then missing them 
did little to undermine its reputation or expectations of low inflation in Germany.   Latin America does not 
enjoy the same luxury. 
 
13 This is not to forget the many studies of inflation targeting for emerging market and developing 
countries.   Savastano (2000) offers offered a concise summary of much of the research as of that date.  
Subsequent contributions include Debelle (2001);  Fraga, Goldfajn, and  Minella (2003);   McKibbin and 
Singh (2003); Mishkin (2000; 2004); and Laxton and Pesenti (2003). 
 
14 One of the few exceptions is Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003). 
15  See Caballero (2000) and comments thereon.  
16 Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993); Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2005); Reinhart and Reinhart 
(2009); Perry (2009); Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti, and Talvi (1997); Gavin, Hausmann and Leiderman 
(1996); Mendoza and Terrones (2008).   8
crises of 1982, 1994-2001, or 2008-09 would not be useful to policy makers in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.      
Capital flows are strikingly prone to exacerbate rather than offset fluctuations  
when the source of the fluctuations is trade shocks.
17  This observation leads us to the 
next relevant respect in which developing countries differ from industrialized countries. 
 
Analysis of how IT works in practice sometimes gives insufficient attention to the 
consequences of supply shocks.    Supply shocks tend to be larger for developing 
countries than for industrialized countries.  One reason is the larger role of farming, 
fishing, and forestry in the economy.    Droughts, floods, hurricanes, and other weather 
events – good as well as bad -- tend to have a much larger effect on GDP in developing 
countries.     When a hurricane hits a Caribbean island, it can virtually wipe out the year’s 
banana crop and tourist season – thus eliminating the two biggest sectors in some of those 
tropical economies.    A second reason for larger supply shocks is terms of trade 
volatility, which is notoriously high for small developing countries.  This is especially 
true of those dependent on agricultural and mineral exports.
18   Another feature of these 
countries is that they tend to be more dependent on imported inputs.   In large rich 
countries, the fluctuations in the terms of trade are both smaller and less likely to be 
exogenous.   
 
As has been shown by a variety of authors, Inflation Targeting (defined narrowly) 
is not robust with respect to supply shocks.
19    Under strict IT, to prevent the price index 
from rising in the face of an adverse supply shock monetary policy must tighten so much 
that the entire brunt of the shock is borne by real GDP.    Most reasonable objective 
functions would, instead, tell the monetary authorities to allow part of the shock to show 
up as an increase in the price level.    Of course this is precisely the reason why many IT 
proponents favor flexible inflation targeting, often in the form of the Taylor Rule which 
does indeed call for the central bank to share the pain between inflation and output.   It is 
also a reason for pointing to the “core” CPI rather than “headline” CPI.  But these 
accommodations are insufficient. 
 
2.3 “Headline” CPI and Core CPI 
 
In practice, inflation-targeting central bankers usually say they respond to large 
temporary shocks in the prices of oil and other agricultural and mineral products by 
excluding them from the measure of the CPI that is targeted.   Central banks have two 
approaches to doing this.   Some publicly explain ex ante that their target for the year is 
inflation in the core CPI, a measure that excludes volatile components, usually farm and 
energy products.   The virtue of this approach is that the central banks are able to abide 
by their public commitments when the supply shock comes.  (This logic assumes the 
                                                 
17 E.g., Hausmann and Rigobon (2003). 
 
18 E.g., Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella, op cit.   The old structuralist school in Latin America believed that 
specialization in primary commodities was undesirable because they faced a low elasticity of demand. 
 
19Among other examples:   Frankel (1985) ;   Frankel, Smit, and Sturzenegger (2008).      9
shock is located in the agricultural or energy sectors.  It doesn’t work, for example, for 
labor unrest or power failures that disrupt industrial activity.)   The disadvantage of 
declaring core CPI as the official target is that the person in the street is less likely to 
understand it, compared to the simple CPI.   Transparency and communication of a target 
that the public can monitor are the original reasons for declaring a specific nominal target 
in the first place.   
The alternative approach is to talk about the ordinary CPI ex ante, but then in the 
face of an adverse supply shock to explain ex post that the increase in farm or energy 
prices is being excluded due to special circumstances.   This strategy can be a public 
relations disaster.   The people in the street are told that they should not be concerned by 
the increase in the CPI because it is “only” occurring in the cost of filling up their auto 
fuel tanks and buying their weekly groceries.   
Either way, ex ante or ex post, the effort to explain away supply-induced 
fluctuations in the CPI undermines the credibility of the monetary authorities.  This 
credibility problem is especially severe in countries where there are serious grounds for 
believing that government officials fiddle with the consumer price indices for political 
purposes, which includes Argentina (recently) and Brazil (in the more distant past), 
among others. 
Given the value that most central bankers place on transparency and their 
reputations, it would be surprising if their public emphasis on the CPI did not lead them 
to be at least a bit more contractionary in response to adverse supply shocks, and 
expansionary in response to favorable supply shocks, than they would otherwise be.  In 
other words, it would be surprising if they felt able to take full advantage of the escape 
clause offered by the idea of core CPI.   There is some reason to think that this is indeed 
the case.    A simple statistic:  the exchange rates of all major inflation-targeting countries 
(in dollars per national currency) are positively correlated with the dollar price on world 
markets of their import baskets.
20    Why is this fact revealing?   The currency should not 
respond to an increase in world prices of its imports by appreciating, to the extent that 
these central banks target core CPI (and to the extent that the commodities excluded by 
core CPI include all imported commodities that experience world price shocks, which is a 
big qualifier).  If anything, floating currencies should depreciate in response to such an 
adverse terms of trade shock.   When these IT currencies respond by appreciating instead, 
it suggests that the central bank is tightening monetary policy to reduce upward pressure 
on the CPI.   
Three columns of Table 1 repeat the correlation calculations for our LAC 
countries, on monthly data.   We take the example of dollar oil prices, since they are the 
most important source of variation in dollar import prices, for oil-importing countries.    
Six of the 18 countries are inflation targeters currently.    We might exclude Guatemala, 
because its transition to inflation targeting is recent, and perhaps not even complete.   We 
should also exclude those LAC countries that are oil producers.   Regardless, every one 
of the inflation targeters shows correlations between dollar import pries and the dollar 
values of their currencies that are both positive over the period 2000-2008 and greater 
than the correlations during the pre-IT period.  The evidence supports the idea inflation 
targeters – in particular, Brazil, Chile and Peru -- tended to react to the positive oil shocks 
of the past decade by tightening monetary policy and thereby appreciating their 
                                                 
20 Frankel (2005).   10
currencies.    The implication seems to be that the CPI which they target does not in 
practice entirely exclude oil price shocks.   Apparently “flexible inflation targeting” is not 
quite as flexible as one would think.  (Argentina, by contrast, is not an inflation targeter, 
and allows its peso to depreciate when world prices of its import goods rise.) 
What is wanted as candidate for nominal target is a variable that is simpler for the 
public to understand ex ante than core CPI, and yet that is robust with respect to supply 
shocks.   Being robust with respect to supply shocks means that the central bank should 
not have to choose ex post between two unpalatable alternatives:  an unnecessary 
economy-damaging recession or an embarrassing credibility-damaging violation of the 
declared target. 
    
2.4 Terms of trade shocks 
 
If the supply shocks are terms of trade shocks, then the choice of CPI to be the 
price index on which IT focuses is particularly inappropriate.  The alternative is an 
output-based price index such as an index of export prices, the GDP deflator, PPI, or a 
specially constructed Product Price Index.   The important difference is that imported 
goods show up in the CPI, but not in the output-based price indices and vice versa for 
exported goods: they show up in the output-based prices but much less in the CPI.    
Proponents of inflation targeting do not seem to have considered this point.   One reason 
may be that the difference is not, in fact, as important for large industrialized countries as 
for small developing countries, especially those that export mineral and agricultural 
products. 
Terms of trade volatility is particularly severe for commodity exporters, which 
includes most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.  If one uses the World 
Bank’s terms of trade index, a list of 40 countries with the greatest volatility out of 166 
countries, is dominated by Africans and oil exporters.
21    But seven LAC countries are in 
the group of 40: Mexico, Venezuela, Haiti, Ecuador, Chile, Peru and Bolivia, in 
descending order of volatility.  Some countries in the region have a large share of their 
exports concentrated in a product – such as coffee, copper, or oil -- that is so volatile that 
it periodically experiences swings in world market conditions that double or halve their 
prices.   The export markets for the manufactured goods and services produced by 
industrialized countries, on the other hand, tend to be much more stable.  This is 
especially true for the larger industrialized countries such as the United States, who have 
more monopoly power and whose exports are more diversified. 
 
                                                 
21 The terms of trade measure is from World Development Indicators.   It appears to be based on unit value 
measures of import and export prices, which many researchers consider highly unreliable, due to shifts in 
the what shows up as unit.    Below we report measures calculated from export and import price indices of 
the Economist Intelligence Unit.   11
Table 2:    Major Commodity Exports in LAC countries  
and Standard Deviation of Prices on World Markets 
* World Bank Analysis (2007 data).                                           Source: Global Financial Data 
 
Table 2 reports the leading export commodity for each of twenty LAC countries, 
and the standard deviation of the dollar price of that commodity on world markets.   
Natural gas and oil are by far the most variable in price.  But the prices of aluminum, 
bananas, coffee, copper, and sugar all show standard deviations above .4;  assuming a 
normal distribution this implies that price swings of plus or minus 80% occur 5% of the 
time.   Only beef and soybeans -- the leading products of Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay – have price volatilities less than this. 
 
Appendix Table 1 reports standard deviations of an export price index, import 
price index, and (the ratio of the two) the terms of trade, for 149 countries and regions.  
The data come from the Economist Intelligence Unit.   Eight of the 20 countries with the 
highest terms of trade volatility are in Latin American and the Caribbean:  Dominican 
Republic, Chile, Venezuela, Honduras, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and 
Ecuador.   (Nine of the top 20 are in Africa and the Middle East.  Nine are oil producers.)   
The extended Mercosur grouping shows higher terms of trade volatility than any other 
geographical grouping worldwide, even the Arabian peninsula, and Latin America is 
higher than any other large grouping. 
The ranking of countries by terms of trade volatility is rather different from the 
ranking by export price volatility.   Some countries that face highly variable prices for 
Leading  
Commodity Export* 
     Standard Deviation of  
Log of Dollar Price  1970‐2008
ARG  Soybeans  0.2781
BOL  Natural Gas  1.8163
BRA  Steel  0.5900
CHL Copper  0.4077
COL  Oil  0.7594
CRI  Bananas  0.4416
ECU  Oil  0.7594
GTM  Coffee  0.4792
GUY  Sugar  0.4749
HND  Coffee  0.4792
JAM  Aluminum  0.4176
MEX  Oil  0.7594
NIC  Coffee  0.4792
PAN Bananas  0.4416
PER  Copper  0.4077
PRY  Beef 0.2298
SLV  Coffee  0.4792
TTO  Natural Gas  1.8163
URY  Beef 0.2298
VEN  Oil  0.7594  12
their exports on world markets do not in fact have highly variable terms of trade; in other 
words the dollar prices of their exports are correlated with the dollar prices of their 
imports so that the two partially cancel out.
22     
 
2.5  The option of an exchange rate target 
 
Many Inflation Targeting central banks in developing countries have all along put 
more emphasis on the exchange rate than they officially admitted.
23   This tendency is the 
famous Fear of Floating of Calvo and Reinhart (2002).  When booming markets for their 
export commodities put upward pressure on their currencies (2003-2008), they intervened 
heavily to dampen appreciation.   Colombia was one of many examples.
24  Then, when 
the global financial crisis hit and especially when it put more severe downward pressure 
on their currencies in the latter part of 2008 -- partly in the form of an abrupt reversal of 
the commodity price spike -- some of these same countries intervened heavily to dampen 
the depreciation of their currencies.  With the rapid restoration of the boom in emerging 
market countries in 2010, their central banks again found themselves intervening to 
dampen strong appreciations.   In 2011 even free floating Chile threw in the towel and 
began to buy dollars to dampen the appreciation of its peso.  The point is that central 
banks still do – and should – pay a lot of attention to their exchange rates.    
The point applies to the entire spectrum from managed floaters to peggers.  Fixed 
exchange rates are still an option to be considered for many countries, especially small 
ones.   For very small countries, especially those that are highly integrated with the 
United States (many countries in Central America and the Caribbean, in particular), an 
institutional peg or even full dollarization remain reasonable options.   
  Fixed exchange rates have many advantages, in addition to their use as a nominal 
anchor for monetary policy.    They reduce transactions costs and exchange risk, which in 
turn facilitates international trade and investment.   This is especially true for 
institutionally locked-in arrangements, such as dollarization.   Influential research by 
Rose (2000) and others over the last decade has shown that fixed exchange rates and, 
especially, monetary unions, increase trade and investment substantially.   In addition 
they avoid the speculative bubbles to which floating exchange rates are occasionally 
subject. 
Of course fixed exchange rates have disadvantages too.   Most importantly, to the 
extent financial markets are integrated, a fixed exchange rate means giving up monetary 
independence;  the central bank can’t increase the money supply, lower the interest rate, 
or devalue the currency, in response to a downturn in demand for its output.    
It has been argued that Latin American governments have misused monetary 
discretion more often than they have used it to achieve the textbook objectives, so that the 
loss of monetary independence under a fixed exchange rate is not to be lamented.    A 
second disadvantage of a fixed rate, however, presupposes no discretionary abilities.  It 
                                                 
22 Examples in Appendix 1 appear to be Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, and Colombia.  But we need to detrend or 
first-difference the series for import prices and export price, which we have not yet done. 
 
23  Edwards (2006) considers whether the exchange rate should play a role in determining monetary policy 
under IT. 
 
24 Vargas (2005)   13
means giving up the automatic accommodation of trade shocks that comes with floating: 
a depreciation when world market conditions for the export commodity weaken, and vice 
versa.
25      Berg, Borensztein, and Mauro (2003) say it well: 
“Another characteristic of a well-functioning floating exchange rate is that it responds 
appropriately to external shocks. When the terms of trade decline, for example, it makes sense for 
the country’s nominal exchange rate to weaken, thereby facilitating the required relative price 
adjustment.  Emerging market floating exchange rate countries do, in fact, react in this way to 
negative terms of trade shocks. In a large sample of developing countries over the past three 
decades, countries that have fixed exchange rate regimes and that face negative terms of trade 
shocks achieve real exchange rate depreciations only with a lag of two years while suffering large 
real GDP declines. By contrast, countries with floating rates display large nominal and real 
depreciations on impact and later suffer some inflation but much smaller output losses.” 
 
Besides the inability to respond monetarily to shocks, there are three more 
disadvantages of rigidity in exchange rate arrangements.   It can impair the central bank’s 
lender of last resort capabilities in the event of a crisis in the banking sector, as Argentina 
demonstrated in 2001.  It entails a loss of seignorage, especially for a country that goes 
all the way to dollarization.    And, finally, for a country that stops short of full 
dollarization, pegged exchange rates are occasionally subject to unprovoked speculative 
attacks of the “second-generation” type.
26 
 
  Econometric attempts to discern what sort of regime delivers the best economic 
performance across countries – firmly fixed, floating, or intermediate – have not been 
successful.
27   Clearly the answer depends on the circumstances of the country in 
question.   Among the many country characteristics that should help determine this 
choice according to the literature is one that features prominently in the simple model of 
the Section 4:  less exposure to external shocks than to domestic and monetary shocks.   
makes it more likely that an exchange rate target dominates other monetary regimes.
28  
 
For Mexico, Central America, most of the Caribbean, and the northwestern part of 
South America, an exchange rate target would naturally mean a dollar target, because so 
much of their trade and other transactions are with the United States.   But Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile trade roughly as much with Europe (or, for that matter, East Asia) as 
they do with the United States.  To peg to the dollar is to introduce volatility vis-à-vis 
Europe, Japan, and other important trading partners.  For them, one must not take as 
given that the relevant anchor currency would be the dollar.  It could be the euro or, more 
likely, a weighted basket.   One possibility is the SDR. 
In 2001, when Argentina’s rigid peg to the dollar was in its death throes, it was 
observed that the country’s trade problems could in a sense be attributed to the original 
                                                 
25 Among peggers, terms-of-trade shocks are amplified and long-run growth is reduced, as compared to 
flexible-rate countries, according to Edwards and Yeyati (2005). Also see  Broda (2004).   
 
26  Obstfeld (1986). 
 
27  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003)  find that floats do a better job than firmly fixed rates or 
intermediate regimes.  Unfortunately, other equally reputable studies find that floats do the best or that 
intermediate regimes do the best. 
 
28  Frankel (2004) reviews the literature on the choice of exchange rate regime for developing countries.   14
1991 decision to link to the currency of a country with which Argentina traded relatively 
little, and to the subsequent 1995-2001 appreciation of the dollar against the euro, 
Brazilian real, and currencies of other major trading partners, as much as it could be 
attributed to the rigidity of the regime per se.   The alternative of a basket that would be 
half dollars and half euros was apparently considered by the authorities at that time. 
  Among the eight monetary regimes to be considered in this study are three 
exchange rate targets:  a peg to the dollar, a peg to the euro, and a peg to the SDR. 
 
 
3. Alternative choices of price index for inflation targeting 
 
  As noted, of the possible price indices that a central bank could target, the CPI is 
the usual choice.   The CPI is indeed the natural candidate to be the measure of the 
inflation objective for the long-term. But it may not be the best choice for intermediate 
target on an annual basis.    There is a case to be made for targeting a price index that 
reflects commodities produced domestically rather than commodities consumed 
domestically.  The idea of targeting an output-based price index in place of the CPI is a 
moderate version of a more exotic proposed monetary regime that I have written about in 
the past, called Peg the Export Price – or PEP, for short.
29      
 
3.1 PEP 
  I have proposed PEP explicitly for those countries that happen to be heavily 
specialized in the production of oil or some other particular mineral or agricultural export 
commodity.   (The original idea was a very special case:  an African gold exporter could 
consider going on the gold standard.
30)   The proposal is to fix the price of that 
commodity in terms of domestic currency.  For example, Chile would peg its currency to 
copper – in effect adopting a metallic standard.   Ecuador, Trinidad and Venezuela would 
peg to oil.
31  Jamaica would peg to bauxite.     The Dominican Republic would peg to 
sugar.   Central American coffee producers would peg to coffee.  Argentina would peg to 
soybeans.  And so forth.     
How would this work operationally?     Conceptually, one can imagine the 
government holding reserves of gold or copper or oil, and buying or selling the 
commodity whenever necessary to keep the price fixed in terms of local currency.    
Operationally, a more practical method would be for the central bank each day to 
announce an exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar, following the rule that the day’s exchange 
rate target (dollars per local currency unit) moves precisely in proportion to the day’s 
price of gold or copper or oil on the New York market (dollars per commodity).   Then 
the central bank could intervene via the foreign exchange market to achieve the day’s 
target.   The dollar would be the vehicle currency for intervention -- precisely as it has 
                                                 
29 Frankel and Saiki (2002) and Frankel (2003). 
 
30 Frankel (2002). 
 
31   In recent years – especially as a result of the large increase in world oil prices toward the end of our 
statistical sample – oil became the leading export commodity of Brazil and Colombia, both of which 
traditionally export coffee and a wide variety of other goods.   15
long been when a small country defends a peg to some non-dollar currency.   Either way, 
the effect would be to stabilize the daily price of the commodity in terms of local 
currency.  Or perhaps, since these commodity prices are determined on world markets, a 
better way to express the same policy is stabilizing the price of local currency in terms of 
the commodity. 
 
The argument for the export targeting proposal, relative to an exchange rate 
target, can be stated succinctly:    It delivers one of the main advantages that a simple 
exchange rate peg promises, namely a nominal anchor, while simultaneously delivering 
one of the main advantages that a floating regime promises, namely automatic adjustment 
in the face of fluctuations in world prices of the countries’ exports. Textbook theory says 
that when there is an adverse movement in the terms of trade, it is desirable to 
accommodate it via a depreciation of the currency.  When the dollar price of exports 
rises, under PEP the currency per force appreciates in terms of dollars.   When the dollar 
price of exports falls, the currency depreciates in terms of dollars.   Such accommodation 
of terms of trade shocks is precisely what is wanted.    In past currency crises, countries 
that have suffered a sharp deterioration in their export markets have often eventually been 
forced to give up their exchange rate targets and devalue anyway.  The adjustment was 
far more painful -- in terms of lost reserves, lost credibility, and lost output -- than if the 
depreciation had happened automatically. 
  The desirability of accommodating terms of trade shocks is also a particularly 
good way to summarize the attractiveness of export price targeting relative to the 
reigning champion, CPI targeting.   Consider the two categories of adverse terms of trade 
shocks: first, a fall in the dollar price of the export in world markets and, second, a rise in 
the dollar price of the import on world markets.   In the first case, a fall in the export 
price, one wants the local currency to depreciate against the dollar.   As already noted, 
PEP delivers that result automatically; CPI targeting does not.    In the second case, a rise 
in the import price, the terms-of-trade criterion suggests that one again might want the 
local currency to depreciate.  Neither regime delivers that result.
32   But CPI targeting 
actually has the implication that the central bank tightens monetary policy so as to 
appreciate the currency against the dollar, by enough to prevent the local-currency price 
of imports from rising.     This implication – reacting to an adverse terms of trade shock 
by appreciating the currency – is perverse.   It can be expected to exacerbate swings in 
the trade balance and output.     
 
3.2 PEPI 
 
  Some responded to the PEP proposal by pointing out, quite correctly, that the 
side-effect of stabilizing the local-currency price of the export commodity in question is 
that it would destabilize the local-currency price of other export goods.     If agricultural 
or mineral commodities constitute virtually all of exports, then this may not be an issue.  
But for a heavy majority of countries, including most of those in Latin America and the 
                                                 
32  There is a reason for that.  In addition to the goal of accommodating terms of trade shocks, there is also 
the goal of price stability; but to depreciate in the face of an increase in import prices would exacerbate an 
inflation shock. 
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Caribbean, no single commodity constitutes more than half of exports.   Moreover, even 
those that are heavily specialized in a single mineral or agricultural product may wish to 
encourage diversification further into new products in the future, so as to be less 
dependent on that single commodity.     For these two sorts of countries, the strict version 
of PEP is not appropriate.    For those countries where export diversification is important, 
a moderated version of PEP is more likely to be suitable.     
 
  One way to moderate the proposal is to interpret it as targeting a broad index of 
all export prices, rather than the price of only one export commodity.    I have 
abbreviated this moderate form of the proposal as PEPI, for Peg the Export Price Index.
33    
Some countries are intermediate with respect to the extent of diversification:   
Exports are dominated by agricultural and mineral commodities, but it is a diversified 
basket of commodities, rather than just oil or coffee.    Examples include Argentina 
(soybeans, wheat, maize and beef), Bolivia (hydrocarbons, zinc, soybeans, iron ore and 
tin) or Jamaica (bauxite, sugar, bananas, rum and coffee).   In that case, the natural price 
index would be a basket of those four or five commodity prices, omitting manufactures 
and services for simplicity.    
 
The proposal is not to be confused, however, with proposals in the 1930s or 1980s 
to improve on the gold standard by targeting a diversified basket of commodities.
34  
Those proposals explicitly included the prices of imported commodities in the index. e.g., 
oil for an oil-importer    The PEPI proposal explicitly excludes them. It also includes 
commodities that may be minor and obscure from the world’s viewpoint but important 
from the viewpoint of the producing country.
35  These two differences are crucial when 
the terms of trade fluctuate. 
 
3.3  PPT 
A way to moderate the proposal still further is to target a broad index of all 
domestically produced goods, whether exportable or not.   PPT stands for Product Price 
Targeting.  The GDP deflator is one possible output-based price index, but has the 
disadvantage of only being available quarterly, and being subject to lags in collection, 
measurement errors, and subsequent revisions.    The PPI is superior in that – just like the 
CPI – it is generally collected monthly.    Even in a small poor country with limited 
capacity to gather statistics, government workers can survey a sample of firms every 
month to construct a primitive PPI as easily as they can survey a sample of retail outlets 
to construct a primitive CPI.    The PPI is a familiar non-threatening variable;  inflation 
targeters should be open-minded enough to consider it as an alternative to the CPI. 
  A possible disadvantage of the PPI as traditionally calculated (the old Wholesale 
Price Index) is that it weights products according to their shares in gross sales by 
businesses.  An implication is that raw materials and other inputs get counted multiple 
times, because they are reflected in the gross sales price at each stage of production.  It 
                                                 
33 Frankel (2005). 
 
34  In the 1930s: Graham (1937); and Keynes (1938).   In the 1980s: Hall (1982, 1985).    
 
35 Such as antimony, tungsten and lithium, for the case of Bolivia. 
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would probably be better to weight product prices by the product’s share of final sales.
36   
A simple product price index could be computed monthly by surveying major 
establishments, and applying to their price changes the sectoral weights that are taken 
from longer-term GDP data. 
3.4 Targeting the price index 
If a broad index of export or product prices were to be the nominal target, it 
would of course be impossible in practice for the central bank to hit the target exactly, in 
contrast to the way that it is possible to hit virtually exactly a target for the exchange rate, 
the price of gold, or even the price of a basket of four or five exchange-traded agricultural 
or mineral commodities.  There would instead be a declared band for the price index 
target, which could be wide if desired, just as with the targeting of the CPI, money 
supply, or other nominal variables.   Open market operations to keep the export price 
index inside the band if it threatens to stray outside could be conducted either in terms of 
foreign exchange or in terms of domestic securities.    
For some countries, it might help to monitor on a daily or weekly basis the price 
of a basket of agricultural and mineral commodities that is as highly correlated as 
possible with the country’s overall price index, but whose components are observable on 
a daily or weekly basis in well-organized markets.  The central bank could even 
announce what the value of the basket index would be one week at a time, by analogy 
with high-frequency announcements of monetary aggregates or interbank interest rates.   
The weekly targets could be set so as to achieve the medium-term goal of keeping the 
comprehensive price index inside the pre-announced bands; and yet the central bank 
could hit the weekly targets very closely, if it wanted, for example, by intervening in the 
foreign exchange market.  This feature would enhance transparency from the viewpoint 
of those who operate in financial markets, even though the average household should not 
realistically be expected to follow such arcane details. 
 
 
                                                 
36 The US Bureau of Economic Analysis in 2007 took steps in the direction of a price index for value 
added.  Going back to 1998, it computes a sort of final-sales price index through its method of  “double 
deflation” – netting intermediate inputs out against gross output.   In 2007 it began releasing a new index of 
aggregate net output prices, which nets out double-counting of transactions within each aggregate industry.   18
4. Targeting the Export Price Index vs. Exchange Rate vs. CPI, in a 
Simple Theoretical Model 
 
We apply two methodologies, one theoretical and one statistical.   This section  
models theoretically the effects of relative prices on output under three alternative 
regimes.  One finding is that a high variability of export price shocks makes it more 
likely that PEPI (Peg the Export Price Index) stabilizes the economy better than an 
exchange rate target.  Another finding is that high sectoral elasticities of supply with 
respect to relative prices make it more likely that PEPI dominates CPI targeting.   The 
heart of the paper, however, is Section 5.  There we report statistical implications of 7 
alternative regimes for movements in key relative prices, without explicitly modeling the 
effects on real output, an exercise that has the virtue of being largely model-free.    
4.1 Assumptions 
 
  The theoretical model is a two-sector version of Frankel (1995), which closely 
followed Rogoff (1985), which in turn introduced shocks into the Barro-Gordon model of 
dynamically-consistent monetary policy.  
 
Assume a supply relationship in each of two production sectors: 
n
e
n n n n u p p b y y + − + = ) (      ( 1 )  
x
e
x x x x u p p d y y + − + = ) (                       (2) 
 
where  
yn & yx  ≡   output of nontraded & export sectors, respectively; 
n y  & 
x y  ≡ potential output in the two sectors;  
 
pn & px ≡ prices in two sectors (in domestic currency) 
pn
e  & px
e ≡ expected prices; 
un & ux  ≡ supply disturbances;      all in logs. 
 
The country is a price-taker on world markets for exports and imports: 
px = s + εx  ,            ( 3 )  
pim = s + εim  ,          ( 4 )  
 
where  
s ≡ exchange rate, spot price domestic currency / $,  
εx ≡ fluctuating $ price of export commodity;   
εim ≡ fluctuating $ price of import good. 
 
Price indices (CPI  & GDP deflator) include the nontraded good and the international 
good, with weights f and (1-f), respectively: 
 
cpi = (f)pim +(1-f)pn     ,        ( 5 )  
p  =  (f)px + (1-f) pn   .        ( 6 )  
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Money market equilibrium: 
 m = p + y - v,          ( 9 )  
 
and exchange rate equation 
s = m - y + e.           ( 1 0 )  
 
where  
m ≡ money supply, 
y ≡ an index of total output,  
v ≡ velocity shocks 
e  ≡ shocks in exchange rate equation. 
 
Objective is to minimize quadratic loss function: 
 
L = a (cpi) 
2 +  f(yx-yx’) 
2  + (1-f)(yn-yn’) 
2 ,   (7) 
 
Minimization of the quadratic loss function under each of the three possible regimes 
yields a set of equations reported in Appendix 3.   The equations determine that the value 
of the loss function under each regime, and therefore which regimes are best at stabilizing 
the economy, as a function of the variances of the five shocks.  The key conclusions are 
reported here. 
 
4.2 Implications for PEPI vs. Exchange rate peg 
Even if there are no export price shocks, the expected loss is smaller under the 
PEPI rule if  f  > 1/2, i.e., if the foreign sector is larger than the domestic sector.    
To the extent that export price shocks are greater than 0, the case is stronger, 
because εx shocks affect output of both exports and nontraded goods, whereas PEPI 
insulates the real economy against them.   If εx shocks are large, then PEPI dominates 
regardless of parameter values.  This finding corresponds to the conventional result that 
exchange rate pegs are less suited to countries with volatile export prices, because they 
are unable to accommodate terms of trade shocks. 
 
4.3 Implications for PEPI vs. CPI rule: 
If a is large, i.e., if stabilizing the CPI per se is top priority, then terms of trade 
and exchange rate shocks hurt more under the PEPI rule than under inflation targeting.   
But shocks to world prices destabilize both output terms under the CPI rule, while PEPI 
insulates the real economy.  Thus if a is small, PEPI dominates the CPI target.   Also, if b 
and d are large, i.e., if supply curves are relatively flat, then PEPI again dominates. 
 
 
5. Analysis of competing monetary targets with respect to ability 
to stabilize relative prices 
 
The remainder of this paper is a counterfactual empirical analysis of alternative 
monetary regimes.   We examine a set of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean,   20
comparing the historical paths of prices under the historical monetary regime with what 
would have happened under eight other possible regimes:  dollar target, euro target, SDR 
target, CPI target, PEP target, PEPI target, and PPT.   For simplicity, we continue to 
assume that the targets are hit precisely under each regime, even though we realize that in 
a stochastic model this would not be possible with half the regimes (the price index 
targets).    
 
Sectoral weights in the price indices 
 
In the empirical analysis we decompose traded goods more than in the model of 
the preceding section, into three different traded goods.    But the countries we are 
interested in are still small open economies.   Thus we continue to assume that the law of 
one price holds, not just for commodity exports but also for other exportables and 
importables, and that the prices of these goods are exogenous in world markets in terms 
of dollars.   So the local-currency prices of the tradable goods are given by the exchange 
rate (actual or hypothetical, as the case may be) times the dollar prices.    
The price index for non-traded goods is determined differently.  They are not 
subject to the law of one price.   Indeed, if all goods were subject to the law of one price, 
then the choice of currency regime would not make very much difference.  The choice of 
monetary regime does make a difference, primarily because wages and prices of 
nontraded goods are sticky in the short run in terms of whatever is the local currency.   In 
the longer run, however, purchasing power parity holds.   Thus, in the case of the dollar 
peg, the local inflation rate – including nontraded goods – converges to the global 
inflation rate, which is here for simplicity taken to be that of the United States.   
Inasmuch as many Latin American countries suffered very high inflation rates in the 
1970s and 1980s, even hyperinflations, it makes a big difference whether the 
counterfactual to the historical experience is that the country was credibly and rigorously 
tied to a nominal target all along, or that the country would have switched at some point 
during the sample period, and would have undergone a period of gradual disinflation in 
non-traded goods.
37       Eventually it would be good to try both kinds of counterfactual.   
For now, we consider the first:  hypothetically, what would have happened if the country 
had always followed the dollar peg or inflation target, from the beginning. 
 
  We define the CPI and PPI each as weighted averages of prices in four sectors, 
working in logs: 
 
CPI = w ntg Pntg +wcx Pcx  + wpm Ppm + w otg Potg  
 
PPI = vntg    Pntg +vcx Pcx  + vpm Ppm + v otg Potg  
                                                 
37 In theoretical models that were popular with monetary economists in the 1980s and 1990s, a change to a 
credibly firm nominal anchor would fundamentally change expectations so that all inflation, in traded and 
non-traded goods alike, would disappear instantly.    In reality, exchange-rate based stabilization attempts 
generally show a lot of inflation inertia. (E.g., Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992.)   Some might claim that an 
exchange rate peg is not a completely credible commitment.  But there can be no more credibly firm 
nominal anchor than full dollarization.   Yet when Ecuador gave up its currency in favor of the dollar, 
neither the inflation rate nor the price level converged rapidly to US levels.   Inflationary momentum, 
rather, continued for a long time.   21
 
Definitions: 
Pntg ≡ price of nontraded goods in local terms.  We assume that, at a horizon of less than 
1 year, these prices would not be affected by differences in the exchange rate.  Under the 
hypothetical counterfactual where a country would have been on a dollar peg all along, 
then its NTG prices are given by the US CPI, since we assume that convergence would 
have taken place in the long run. 
 
Pcx ≡ price of exports of leading mineral/agricultural commodities in local terms.  We 
ignore trade barriers and define these TG prices to equal the actual historically observed 
world dollar prices, times the exchange rate, which will differ depending on the monetary 
regime assumed. 
 
Pox ≡ price of other exports.  Again, we assume perfect passthrough: the local price is the 
exchange rate times the exogenous world price. 
 
Ppm ≡ price of petroleum product imports (oil & natural gas, refined or nonrefined), 
determined again as actual world dollar price times the simulated exchange rate.    
 
Potg ≡ price of other tradable goods (i.e., excluding oil and the other commodities that are 
measured explictly).   We assume Potg is equal to world prices of the TGs times the 
exchange rate.  We need not have data on these prices directly.  We are assuming these 
countries are all price-takers for all tradable goods, not just for commodities.  Thus in a 
counterfactual simulation which says that some alternative regime would have caused the 
peso/$ exchange rate to have been 5% higher than it was historically, we simply assume 
this component of the price index Potg would similarly have been 5% higher, relative to 
the historical baseline.  
 
w ntg  ≡ weight on ntg in CPI   
wcx   ≡ weight on cx in CPI   
wpm ≡ weight on pm in CPI   
w otg ≡ weight on otg in CPI   
 
v ntg  ≡ weight on ntg in PPI   
v cx   ≡ weight on cx in PPI   
vpm ≡ weight on pm in PPI   
v otg ≡ weight on otg in PPI   
 
We impose w ntg  ≡ v ntg  . 
 
The key difference between the two price indices is that the weight of the 
commodity export should be far smaller in the CPI than in the PPI, and the weight of the 
import commodity the other way around. 
  Table 3 reports the estimated weights that the countries’ CPI and PPI, 
respectively, place on each of three sectors:  non-tradable goods, the leading commodity 
export (which in two cases is oil), and other tradables (which includes imports, exports 
other than the leading commodity export, and any other goods that are perfect substitutes   22
for internationally traded goods).    The methods for estimating the weights are described 
in Appendix 4.   Mexico (located next to the United States and having followed open 
trade policies for 20 years) shows the lowest share of goods that are not internationally 
traded, while Argentina (which is distant, and generally protectionist) registers the 
highest.     
As one would expect, the share of the commodity export in the CPI is usually 
lower than its share in the PPI, sometimes far lower (Argentina, Bolivia, Jamaica, Peru 
and Uruguay).    The two exceptions are Mexico and Paraguay.   One can guess a 
possible explanation for Mexico:   petroleum products are heavily subsidized in domestic 
consumption, and oil production has been declining in recent years.  Paraguay is a puzzle. 
The explanation might simply be that it is one of the few Latin American countries that is 
not heavily specialized in the production and export of a small number of agricultural or 
mineral commodities. 
 
 
Table 3:   Estimation for each country of weights placed by national price index on 3 
sectors: nontradable goods, leading commodity export, and other tradable goods 
Country  Price index 
Non 
Tradables 
Leading 
Commodity 
Export 
Oil 
Other 
Tradables 
Total 
CPI  0.6939 0.0063 0.0431 0.2567  1.000
ARG 
PPI  0.6939 0.0391 0.0230 0.2440  1.000
CPI  0.5782 0.0163 0.0141 0.3914  1.000
BOL 
PPI  0.5782 0.1471 0.0235 0.2512  1.000
CPI  0.5235 0.0079 0.0608 0.4078  1.000
CHL 
PPI  0.5235 0.0100 0.1334 0.3332  1.000
CPI  0.5985  ‐‐  0.0168 0.3847  1.000
COL* 
PPI  0.5985  ‐‐  0.0407 0.3608  1.000
CPI  0.6413 0.0002 0.0234 0.3351  1.000
JAM 
PPI  0.6413 0.1212 0.0303 0.2072  1.000
CPI  0.3749  ‐‐  0.0366 0.5885  1.000
MEX* 
PPI  0.3749  ‐‐  0.0247 0.6003  1.000
CPI  0.3929 0.1058 0.0676 0.4338  1.000
PRY 
PPI  0.3929 0.0880 0.0988 0.4204  1.000
CPI  0.6697 0.0114 0.0393 0.2796  1.000
PER 
PPI  0.6697 0.040504 0.021228 0.268568  1.000
CPI  0.6230 0.0518 0.0357 0.2895  1.000
URY 
PPI  0.6230 0.2234 0.1158 0.0378  1.000
* Oil is the leading commodity export.     
 
 
5.2 Simulations of the relative prices of tradables and nontradables. 
 
The subsequent analysis presumes that, for commodity-producing countries such 
as those in Latin America and the Caribbean, a highly volatile terms of trade is perhaps   23
the most important issue to be addressed by currency policy, second to the fundamental 
decision to anchor inflationary expectations by a nominal target.   Of course small 
countries are assumed to have no control over the price of their exports relative to the 
price of their imports.  That relative price is the terms of trade, and is determined 
exogenously on world markets.   But the currency regime does help determine variation 
in the relative price of traded goods (both the export commodities and other traded 
goods), that is, the price relative to the price of nontraded goods or relative to the CPI or 
to wages.    
Relative to floating, the goal is to moderate a cycle where a strong, but perhaps 
temporary, upward swing in the world price of the export commodity causes a large real 
appreciation in the currency (Dutch Disease), an increase in spending (especially by the 
government), an increase in the price of nontraded goods relative to non-export-
commodity traded goods, a resultant shift of resources out of non-export-commodity 
traded goods, and a current account deficit -- all of which are painfully reversed when the 
world price of the export commodity goes back down.    Relative to a fixed exchange rate 
or a CPI target, PEP and PPT might show an advantage in accommodating fluctuations in 
the terms of trade.   The goal is that a worsening in the terms of trade induces a weaker 
currency under PPT than it would under CPI-targeting, and therefore raises the price of 
tradable goods relative to nontraded goods so as to encourage more of their production.    
For those who wonder what the market failure is, the distortion at which monetary 
policy is aimed, the answer is that such price swings induce current account deficits and 
capital inflows that are not optimizing in the way standard theory says.    Facets of the 
market failure could be excessively procyclical capital flows (including perhaps the 
absence of an effective international mechanism for handling default), or a political 
economy proclivity for governments to over-spend when the purchasing power of their 
revenues goes up (due to soaring commodity export tax receipts
38), or speculative 
bubbles in real estate
39 (as investors jump on the bandwagon of rising nontraded goods 
prices).   
We will simulate the variability of the real prices of exports.  It captures the 
unwanted side-effects of commodity booms (and busts):   (1) the excessive swings in 
price signals that historically have induced labor and land to move into the production of 
commodities during the boom, only to reverse when the crash comes, and (2) the 
excessive swings in government revenue (royalties and corporate taxes on the commodity 
sector) in terms of purchasing power over local goods and services, which historically 
have tempted governments into pro-cyclical spending. 
 
More specifically, our analysis is guided by the assumption that the goals are, to 
the extent possible, to minimize variability in the real price of commodity exports (to 
moderate resource swings into that sector when its world price temporarily rises, 
especially) and to minimize variability in the real price of other traded goods (to 
moderate resource swings out of that sector, especially into nontraded goods).     Again, 
                                                 
38  E.g., Tornell and Lane (1998). 
 
39  Aizenman and Jinjarak (2008) find a strong positive association between current account deficits and the 
real increase in real estate prices. 
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these two objectives are second to the objective of anchoring inflationary expectations.  
But any nominal anchor can do that.
40   
We could choose to measure the relative price of traded goods in terms of non-
traded goods, or in terms of wages.   Instead we choose to measure the prices of these 
traded goods relative to the CPI.   This comes pretty much to the same thing, because 
nontraded goods are the only other component in the CPI, other than traded goods (and 
the relative price of commodity exports versus other traded goods is deemed exogenous). 
 
The charts in Appendix 5 illustrate the simulated paths of the nominal and real 
prices of major export commodities and of a commodity price index in twenty Latin 
American and Caribbean countries.   Each graph shows the historical price path and 
several counterfactual alternatives, depending on the currency peg or price target that 
could hypothetically have been in effect. 
The various panels of Table 4 present the corresponding results in terms of the 
variability of real prices under alternative regimes.   In each case, the first column reports 
the actual historical variability experienced by the country in question, under whatever 
regime or (more often) sequence of regimes it chose to follow.   One can see the high 
variability of nominal prices for the leading export commodities.   The highest standard 
deviations are copper for Chile, oil for Ecuador and Venezuela, and beef for Uruguay.     
These prices in Table 4(a) are in domestic currency, so variability depends in part 
on the stability of the exchange rate regime, and not solely on the volatility of the world 
export market (Table 2).   Some small countries that have been pegged to the dollar 
during most of their history show price variability that is lower than others despite 
commodities that are at least as variable:   dollarized Panama with bananas, Trinidad with 
oil, and Guatemala with coffee.   In theory, the floating peso of Mexico or Chile, 
respectively, could have appreciated precisely in proportion when dollar prices of oil or 
copper rise, thereby eliminating variation in the peso price of oil or copper.   In practice, 
this tendency does not come close to fully insulating them from variation in the domestic 
prices of their leading export commodities;  indeed floating exchange rates may offer 
some extraneous volatility. Interestingly, the standard deviation of an aggregate export 
price index (PEPI) is in many cases not much less than (or is even greater than) the 
standard deviation for individual commodities, suggesting that the commodity prices are 
highly correlated.    
 
5.3 Comparison of the ability of alternative regimes to stabilize real export prices 
 
The remaining columns in Table 4 are the counterfactuals.   We begin with the 
case of a hypothetical peg to the dollar.  Notice that it is the same as the historical peg in 
the case of Panama.   In the other cases, we can simulate precisely what the price of soy, 
copper, etc. would have been in terms of pesos (let’s call the domestic currency the peso) 
under the counterfactual, by using the historical series for the exchange rate between the 
peso and the dollar:    if the peso historically depreciated against the dollar by 1% in some 
given month, we know that the price of soy would have been lower by precisely 1% if the 
                                                 
40 Except to the extent that the variable chosen for nominal anchor is too likely to lead to intolerably big 
distortions when faced with shocks and thereby is not credible from the beginning.    (This was the case 
with M1 targeting and, I would argue, would be also with strict CPI targeting.)       25
peso had instead been pegged to the dollar.   In general, the dollar pegs would have 
produced far more stable prices in domestic terms.  This is true of all six nominal 
anchors, and simply illustrates the tremendous price instability that almost all these 
countries experienced in the 1970s and 1980s.      
The next two columns of Table 4(a) show what the variability of the commodity 
export prices would have been under an SDR peg or euro peg, respectively.   Variability 
of the domestic price of the commodity export is often lower under the euro peg than 
under the dollar peg:  for natural gas and oil; iron and steel; copper, aluminum and gold; 
bananas and sugar; and soy and beef.    Coffee is virtually the only exception.    This 
illustrates a point frequently missed by observers who read too much into the fact that 
international trade in these commodities is usually invoiced in dollars.    While the use of 
the dollar as currency of invoice and payment may introduce some dollar-stickiness in the 
very short run, it does not carry over to the medium run.   When the effective foreign 
exchange value of the dollar rises,  dollar prices of these commodities tend to fall rather 
quickly.  The offset is not fully proportionate;  but the point is that the prices are not more 
stable in terms of dollars than in terms of euros.    Table 4(a) shows that in some cases 
(soy, coffee and beef), the basket offered by the SDR would stabilize commodity prices 
better than either the dollar or euro.  Even in these cases, however, the difference is small, 
and this benefit would hardly seem worth giving up the simplicity of a single-currency 
peg. 
 
After the currency peg columns comes PEP (Peg the Export Price).   Variability 
of the local-currency price of the leading export commodities is zero, by construction.  
The same is true of the full basket of exports in the case of PEPI (Peg the Export Price 
Index).   Recall the essence of this regime: every time the dollar price of coffee falls by 
one per cent on world markets, the dollar value of the local currency falls by one per cent, 
leaving the local price of coffee unchanged.    Nominal variability is far lower than under 
floating, and yet there is a clear nominal target to anchor inflation expectations.  The best 
of both regimes.  An overall judgment on the merits of the alternative regimes would 
have to be based on far more than this, of course.  The column of zeros is a conspicuous 
“stacking of the deck” in favor of PEP and PEPI. 
 
Table 4(b) reports the standard deviations of the percentage changes in the local-
currency commodity prices across the seven regimes.    Again the currency pegs stabilize 
prices relative to the historical regime.  (As one would expect, the reduction in volatility 
no longer looks quite so dramatic).   The euro peg no longer dominates the dollar peg in 
terms of reducing local-currency price volatility;  this is again what one would expect 
from a dollar-stickiness of commodity prices that pertains only to the short term. 
Table 4(c) shows the standard deviation of real prices of the commodity exports, 
across the seven regimes.   Real is here defined in terms of the CPI, but we could just as 
well be looking at the relative price in terms of non-traded goods.   This is the most 
important of the three measures of price volatility.   It captures the unwanted side-effects 
of the commodity cycle:   (1) the excessive swings in relative price signals that 
historically have induced resources to move in and out of the production of commodities, 
and (2) the excessive swings in real government revenue, which historically have yielded 
pro-cyclical spending.   26
The comparison of a PPI target with a CPI target, as an alternate possible 
interpretation of inflation targeting, is the unique point of this study.   The comparison in 
terms of ability to stabilize domestic prices of the principle export commodities appears 
in the last two columns of Tables 4(a) through 4(c).  In most cases the standard deviation 
of the domestic price of the export commodity is lower under the PPI target than under 
the CPI target.  In a few cases, it is less than half the size:  Jamaica for aluminum and 
Uruguay for beef.  The only times when variability is higher under the PPI target than 
under the CPI target is Mexico for oil and Paraguay for beef.   The reason is immediately 
apparent:  these were the only two countries where the export commodity strangely 
received a heavier estimated weight in the CPI than in the PPI.  This cannot be the normal 
situation.    
The aspect of these tables that might be considered surprising is that, even though 
variability of the export commodity price tends to be lower under a PPI target than under 
a CPI target, under either form of inflation targeting it is generally substantially higher 
than under a currency peg, and often higher even than under the various historical 
regimes.   Perhaps this is an artifact of our approach that operationalizes inflation 
targeting as the precise hitting of the price index target, whether PPI or CPI.   In practice 
this would be impossible to achieve.  In our results, it is possible to achieve, but perhaps 
only at the expense of imposing wild fluctuations in the exchange rate to offset fully 
fluctuations in any one sector of the price index.   Perhaps a more reasonable and realistic 
approach that allowed a band or cone for the targeted price index would yield more 
realistic results.  In any case, the methods for implementing the CPI and PPI targets bear 
further examination in future research. 
Stabilizing domestic prices of the export commodity is far from the only criterion 
that should be considered in comparing alternative candidates for nominal anchor.     
Another one is stabilizing domestic prices of other tradable goods.  A valid critique of 
PEP and PEPI is that it transfers uncertainty that would otherwise occur in the real price 
of commodity exports into uncertainty (which otherwise might not occur) in the real price 
of non-commodity exportables and importables.   This critique is particularly relevant if 
diversification of the economy is valued. 
 
5.4 Comparison of ability of alternative regimes to stabilize real traded goods prices 
overall 
 
In Table 5 we show the outcomes of simulations, under the same seven alternative 
regimes, of the domestic prices of import goods.    From the viewpoint of a small country, 
imports, like exports, have their prices determined on world markets.   The biggest source 
of variability in the world price of LAC imports is bound to be oil price shocks (for the 
countries that are oil importers, rather than exporters).   Tables 5(a) and 5(b) report the 
statistics on the variability of the nominal import price, measured in terms of levels or 
changes respectively.   Again, the currency pegs cut nominal price variability 
substantially relative to the historical regime, but the euro peg and SDR peg both slightly 
dominate the dollar peg.    The commodity peg (PEP) does indeed introduce some extra 
volatility into import prices, through exchange rate fluctuations, but the difference is not 
large.   When we look at the level of local import prices, PPI targeting dominates CPI 
targeting.   This supports the claim that the CPI target, if interpreted literally, forces the   27
monetary authorities to tighten and appreciate in a perverse response to an increase in the 
world price of oil import (in the case of oil importers), and that the PPI target does not.   
When we look at changes in local import prices, the standard deviations under the CPI 
target and the PPI target are very close to each other, and close to the standard deviation 
under the currency pegs as well. 
 
  An attempt to construct anything like a comprehensive evaluation of regimes 
rooted in a theoretically established welfare criterion is far beyond the ambitions of this 
study.    On the other hand, we cannot end the study with a state of affairs where the only 
horse race insures by construction that PEP wins.
41    Instead, we conclude with an 
examination, in Table 6, of the implications of the alternative regimes for a simple 
objective function that is a weighted average of the standard deviation of the real price of 
commodity exports and the standard deviation of the real price of other tradables (just oil 
in this case, or another largest single import good: steel).    In other words we pursue the 
logic that stabilizing the relative price of commodity exports is not much of an 
accomplishment if it comes at the expense of a corresponding destabilization of the 
relative price of other traded goods. 
  The commodity price peg (PEP) is the winner in the competition to reduce 
relative price variability, by a fairly substantial margin when we look at the level of 
nominal prices (Table 6a) or the level of real prices (Table 6c), and by a smaller margin 
when we look at changes in nominal prices (Table 6b).   The three currency pegs are 
again fairly similar to each other, showing less price variability than the historical regime 
but more than the commodity peg.    In the central competition of the last two columns, 
the PPI target produces less relative price variability than the CPI target in most cases.    
Looking at real price variability in Table 6c, the only exception is Peru; the gain is 
substantial in the case of Jamaica and Uruguay, smaller for the others. 
 
 
6. Summary of Conclusions 
 
  What nominal variable is the best candidate for an anchor to monetary policy?  
Inflation Targeting, with its usual focus on the CPI, has over the past decade been the 
most popular choice among monetary economists, at least with respect to large 
industrialized countries.  But developing countries differ in a number of relevant 
                                                 
41 The first PEP papers pursued counterfactual simulations for the paths of exports, trade balances, and debt 
under alternative possible nominal anchors, for a wide variety of commodity-producing countries (Frankel, 
2002, 03, 05; Frankel and Saiki, 2002).   There nothing was foreordained.   But PEP did tend to product the 
result that in the late 1990s, when dollar commodity prices fell and many emerging market countries 
experienced currency crises, PEP automatically depreciated the currency, stimulated exports, and mitigated 
the debt problem – all without the need to abandon the pre-declared nominal anchor.   LAC countries that 
appear in those simulations include Argentina (wheat); Bolivia, Ghana and Peru (gold), Brazil, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru (coffee);  Chile (copper); Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela (oil); Bolivia and Peru (silver); and  Jamaica and Surinam (aluminum).   
Of course commodity composition of exports evolves over time; some of these associations may not be as 
relevant looking forward. 
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structural ways.  They tend to be smaller, and thus to take prices of both imports and 
exports as given on world markets.   They tend to be more vulnerable to supply shocks, 
particularly terms of trade shocks.  This is especially true of countries that depend on the 
exports of agricultural and mineral commodities, a description that fits most countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.    But terms of trade variability is not the same as 
export price variability; movements in dollar prices of imports also play a big role.   
Three countries with very high variability in the terms of trade overall are Chile, the 
Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. 
The regimes currently followed by the LAC countries are generally distributed 
across three categories:   monetary targets, exchange rate targets, and inflation targets.   
These are official regimes; in practice many of the countries deviate from the declared 
targeting policy.  Money-targeters, for example, let the monetary aggregates run well 
outside the proclaimed range, and inflation targeters intervene heavily in the foreign 
exchange market. 
  This study has focused on a comparison of exchange rate pegs and inflation 
targets, but has also highlighted a new untried set of proposals.   These proposals call for 
targeting prices of whatever commodities are the important products of the country in 
question.     The proposals range from the most exotic to the more down-to-earth.   The 
most exotic is the idea of Pegging the Export Price (PEP):   Bolivia would fix the dollar 
price of the sole to the dollar price of natural gas; Chile would intervene to keep the value 
of its peso constant in terms of copper;  Jamaica would peg its dollar to aluminum;  and 
Uruguay would peg its peso to the price of beef.    A less radical version that takes export 
diversification into account is Peg the Export Price Index (PEPI), which aims to stabilize 
a basket, perhaps a comprehensive basket, of export prices in terms of the local currency.   
Finally, the new improved version is Product Price Targeting (PPT):  to target in place of 
the CPI the Producer Price Index or a specially constructed index of product prices 
weighted by shares in output.    All three of the output-based price targets appear to 
dominate a policy of targeting the CPI, to the extent that terms of trade shocks are 
important.  All three have the desirable property that the currency appreciates when 
prices for exports go up on world markets and depreciates when they go down;  the CPI 
does not have that desirable property.    
In addition, if inflation targeting is interpreted strictly as a commitment to the 
CPI, it has the undesirable property that the currency appreciates when the prices of 
imports such as oil go up on world markets, and depreciates when they go down;   PEP, 
PEPI and PPT targeting don’t have this undesirable property.   Table 1 provides a 
preliminary indication that ever since 1999, when Brazil and Chile switched from 
exchange rate targeting to CPI targeting, they have experienced a higher correlation 
between the dollar price of their currencies and the dollar price of oil imports.   This 
suggests that, language about core CPI notwithstanding, the monetary authorities in these 
two countries have found it necessary to respond to the oil price increases of the last 
decade by contracting monetary policy enough to appreciate their currencies.   The 
production-based price targets would not have this problem. 
  The heart of the analysis is the comparison of seven alternative nominal targets 
according to how they would affect the variability of the real prices of tradables:    
commodity exports in Table 4, imports in Table 5, and both together in Table 6.   Some 
conclusions are very predictable.  First, according to the simulations the currency anchors   29
offer far more price stability than does the historical reality, because our counterfactual 
was that the countries had the benefits of the anchor from before the beginning of the 
sample.    Second, PEP perfectly stabilizes the domestic price of export commodities, by 
construction. 
  The more interesting findings are the comparison of a CPI target and a Product 
Price target as alternative interpretations of inflation targeting.    The results show that the 
PPI target generally delivers more stability in the prices of traded goods, especially the 
export commodity.  This is a natural consequence of the larger weight on commodity 
exports in the PPI than in the CPI.   Perhaps surprisingly, both the CPI target and the PPI 
target deliver more relative price variability than any of the three exchange rate targets 
(dollar, euro and SDR).   More research is clearly needed here, to see if the estimation of 
the sectoral weights and the price series can be improved, and to make the comparison 
more realistic by allowing the CPI and Product Price Index to fall within a target range 
rather than requiring the central bank to hit a target precisely.   30
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Table 4: Variability of Export Prices under Alternative Currency Regimes 
(a) Standard Deviation of Level of Nominal Export Prices 
Historical 
Regime
Dollar Peg SDR Peg Euro Peg
Comm. 
Peg
CPI Target PPI Target
ARG Soy 1.927 0.278 0.251 0.265 0.000 1.271 1.037
ARG Basket 1.966 0.331 0.281 0.260 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
ARG PEPI 2.433 0.104 0.064 0.093 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BOL Nat. Gas 1.997 0.627 0.591 0.594 0.000 0.907 0.584
BOL PEPI 1.685 0.581 0.594 0.581 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BRA Steel 2.240 0.590 0.495 0.418 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BRA Iron Ore 2.180 0.460 0.388 0.333 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BRA Basket 2.186 0.415 0.333 0.281 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BRA PEPI 2.601 0.405 0.320 0.236 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
CHL Copper 3.178 0.408 0.342 0.311 0.000 1.113 0.952
COL Oil 2.315 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.000 1.123 0.974
COL Coffee 1.752 0.479 0.494 0.504 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
COL PEPI 0.553 0.186 0.155 0.166 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
CRI Bananas 1.930 0.442 0.372 0.306 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
CRI Coffee 1.577 0.479 0.494 0.504 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
ECU Oil 3.288 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
ECU PEPI 3.044 0.491 0.457 0.426 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
GTM Coffee 0.910 0.479 0.494 0.504 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
GUY Sugar 2.059 0.475 0.433 0.436 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
GUY PEPI 1.914 0.404 0.372 0.325 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
HND Coffee 0.971 0.479 0.494 0.504 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
HND PEPI 0.937 0.277 0.305 0.334 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
JAM Aluminium 1.959 0.418 0.361 0.303 0.000 1.222 0.565
JAM PEPI 1.579 0.167 0.155 0.199 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
MEX Oil 3.238 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.000 0.975 1.030
NIC Coffee 2.185 0.479 0.494 0.504 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
PAN Bananas 0.442 0.442 0.372 0.306 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
PER Copper 1.923 0.408 0.342 0.311 0.000 0.671 0.688
PER Gold 1.909 0.708 0.638 0.536 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
PER PEPI 1.951 0.378 0.320 0.288 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
PRY Beef 1.623 0.230 0.206 0.224 0.000 0.694 0.715
SLV Coffee 0.670 0.479 0.494 0.504 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
TTO Nat. Gas 0.929 0.627 0.591 0.594 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
URY Beef 3.641 0.230 0.206 0.224 0.000 0.893 0.410
VEN Oil 2.931 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
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(b) Standard Deviation of First Difference of Nominal Export Prices 
Historical 
Regime
Dollar Peg SDR Peg Euro Peg
Comm. 
Peg
CPI Target PPI Target
ARG Soy 0.201 0.067 0.068 0.073 0.000 0.061 0.041
ARG Basket 0.179 0.051 0.052 0.059 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
ARG PEPI 1.798 1.385 1.299 1.570 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BOL Nat. Gas 0.417 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.000 0.102 0.071
BOL PEPI 0.204 0.055 0.059 0.066 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BRA Steel 0.149 0.090 0.091 0.095 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BRA Iron Ore 0.123 0.050 0.054 0.059 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BRA Basket 0.127 0.046 0.048 0.055 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BRA PEPI 0.969 0.097 0.101 0.131 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
CHL Copper 0.122 0.078 0.076 0.078 0.000 0.070 0.073
COL Oil 0.078 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.000 0.067 0.059
COL Coffee 0.083 0.083 0.085 0.090 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
COL PEPI 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.042 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
CRI Bananas 0.159 0.154 0.156 0.158 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
CRI Coffee 0.096 0.083 0.085 0.090 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
ECU Oil 0.089 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
ECU PEPI 0.177 0.170 0.171 0.174 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
GTM Coffee 0.092 0.083 0.085 0.090 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
GUY Sugar 0.135 0.105 0.105 0.108 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
GUY PEPI 0.379 0.217 0.217 0.224 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
HND Coffee 0.109 0.083 0.085 0.090 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
HND PEPI 0.282 0.259 0.260 0.267 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
JAM Aluminium 0.065 0.049 0.052 0.059 0.000 0.048 0.018
JAM PEPI 0.192 0.128 0.124 0.150 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
MEX Oil 0.090 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.000 0.064 0.067
NIC Coffee 0.184 0.083 0.085 0.090 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
PAN Bananas 0.154 0.154 0.156 0.158 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
PER Copper 0.168 0.078 0.076 0.078 0.000 0.076 0.076
PER Gold 0.158 0.051 0.049 0.051 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
PER PEPI 0.218 0.136 0.138 0.142 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
PRY Beef 0.065 0.044 0.047 0.055 0.000 0.027 0.031
SLV Coffee 0.096 0.083 0.085 0.090 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
TTO Nat. Gas 0.109 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
URY Beef 0.076 0.044 0.047 0.055 0.000 0.028 0.022
VEN Oil 0.116 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
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(c) Standard Deviation of Level of Real Export Prices 
Historical 
Regime
Dollar Peg SDR Peg Euro Peg
Comm. 
Peg
CPI Target PPI Target
ARG Soy 0.561 0.497 0.523 0.483 0.000 0.858 0.767
ARG Basket 0.578 0.418 0.443 0.408 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
ARG PEPI 0.312 0.140 0.128 0.110 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BOL Nat. Gas 0.556 0.402 0.431 0.483 0.000 0.438 0.322
BOL PEPI 0.523 0.616 0.650 0.638 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BRA Steel 0.496 0.427 0.403 0.363 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BRA Iron Ore 0.412 0.332 0.353 0.335 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BRA Basket 0.355 0.360 0.370 0.336 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
BRA PEPI 0.403 0.191 0.220 0.206 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
CHL Copper 0.418 0.485 0.496 0.451 0.000 0.909 0.815
COL Oil 0.456 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.000 1.123 0.974
COL Coffee 0.528 0.690 0.717 0.680 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
COL PEPI 0.121 0.153 0.128 0.138 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
CRI Bananas 0.273 0.252 0.283 0.281 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
CRI Coffee 0.566 0.690 0.717 0.680 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
ECU Oil 0.456 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
ECU PEPI 0.302 0.381 0.406 0.404 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
GTM Coffee 0.603 0.690 0.717 0.680 0.000
GUY Sugar 0.823 0.677 0.676 0.624 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
GUY PEPI 0.692 0.375 0.400 0.396 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
HND Coffee 0.594 0.690 0.717 0.680 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
HND PEPI 0.414 0.507 0.525 0.491 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
JAM Aluminium 0.272 0.281 0.321 0.316 0.000 1.222 0.565
JAM PEPI 0.239 0.363 0.383 0.356 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
MEX Oil 0.479 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.000 0.975 1.030
NIC Coffee 0.482 0.690 0.717 0.680 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
PAN Bananas 0.210 0.252 0.283 0.281 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
PER Copper 0.408 0.485 0.496 0.451 0.000 0.437 0.434
PER Gold 0.250 0.440 0.422 0.406 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
PER PEPI 0.338 0.349 0.345 0.308 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
PRY Beef 0.312 0.425 0.468 0.441 0.000 0.694 0.715
SLV Coffee 0.945 0.690 0.717 0.680 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
TTO Nat. Gas 0.357 0.402 0.431 0.483 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
URY Beef 0.494 0.425 0.468 0.441 0.000 0.893 0.410
VEN Oil 0.429 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
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Table 5: Variability of Import Prices under Alternative Currency Regimes * 
(a) Standard Deviation of  Level of Nominal Import Prices 
Historical 
Regime
Dollar 
Peg
SDR Peg Euro Peg
Comm. 
Peg
CPI 
Target
PPI 
Target
ARG Oil 2.242 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.647 0.886 0.740
ARG Steel 2.134 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.428 0.982 0.749
BOL Oil 1.939 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.358 0.771 0.659
BOL Steel 2.052 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.478 0.586 0.501
BRA Oil 2.290 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.538  ‐‐  ‐‐
CHL Oil 3.636 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.597 0.771 0.578
CHL Steel 3.372 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.345 0.817 0.677
COL Steel 2.166 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.538 1.193 1.073
CRI Oil 2.142 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.484  ‐‐  ‐‐
CRI Steel 1.967 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.405  ‐‐  ‐‐
ECU Steel 3.187 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.538  ‐‐  ‐‐
GTM Oil 1.444 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.765  ‐‐  ‐‐
GTM Steel 1.323 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.669  ‐‐  ‐‐
GUY Oil 2.463 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.766  ‐‐  ‐‐
GUY Steel 2.367 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.581  ‐‐  ‐‐
HND Oil 1.504 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.765  ‐‐  ‐‐
HND Steel 1.370 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.669  ‐‐  ‐‐
JAM Oil 2.207 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.452 1.074 0.777
MEX Steel 3.125 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.538 1.050 1.094
NIC Oil 2.389 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.765  ‐‐  ‐‐
NIC Steel 2.338 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.669  ‐‐  ‐‐
PAN Oil 0.759 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.484  ‐‐  ‐‐
PAN Steel 0.527 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.405  ‐‐  ‐‐
PER Oil 2.115 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.597 0.792 0.718
PER Steel 2.059 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.345 0.803 0.613
PRY Oil 2.049 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.625 0.792 0.718
PRY Steel 1.939 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.444 0.803 0.613
SLV Oil 1.153 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.765  ‐‐  ‐‐
SLV Steel 1.012 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.669  ‐‐  ‐‐
TTO Oil 1.089 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.358  ‐‐  ‐‐
TTO Steel 0.914 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.478  ‐‐  ‐‐
URY Oil 3.966 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.625 0.693 0.639
URY Steel 3.896 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.444 0.562 0.408
VEN Steel 2.835 0.527 0.428 0.349 0.538  ‐‐  ‐‐
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(b) Standard Deviation of First Difference of Nominal Import Prices 
Historical 
Regime
Dollar 
Peg
SDR Peg Euro Peg
Comm. 
Peg
CPI Target PPI Target
ARG Oil 0.197 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.099 0.058 0.076
ARG Steel 0.209 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.112 0.105 0.106
BOL Oil 0.218 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.183 0.207 0.137
BOL Steel 0.223 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.261 0.287 0.205
BRA Oil 0.140 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.111  ‐‐  ‐‐
CHL Oil 0.124 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.097 0.062 0.050
CHL Steel 0.143 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.125 0.109 0.110
COL Steel 0.104 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.125 0.106 0.106
CRI Oil 0.087 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.174  ‐‐  ‐‐
CRI Steel 0.110 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.189  ‐‐  ‐‐
ECU Steel 0.116 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.125  ‐‐  ‐‐
GTM Oil 0.086 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.110  ‐‐  ‐‐
GTM Steel 0.116 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.134  ‐‐  ‐‐
GUY Oil 0.112 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.124  ‐‐  ‐‐
GUY Steel 0.135 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.151  ‐‐  ‐‐
HND Oil 0.103 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.110  ‐‐  ‐‐
HND Steel 0.128 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.134  ‐‐  ‐‐
JAM Oil 0.085 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.077 0.063 0.079
MEX Steel 0.117 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.125 0.106 0.106
NIC Oil 0.182 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.110  ‐‐  ‐‐
NIC Steel 0.194 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.134  ‐‐  ‐‐
PAN Oil 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.174  ‐‐  ‐‐
PAN Steel 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.189  ‐‐  ‐‐
PER Oil 0.191 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.097 0.068 0.086
PER Steel 0.189 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.125 0.111 0.117
PRY Oil 0.088 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.085 0.068 0.086
PRY Steel 0.114 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.116 0.111 0.117
SLV Oil 0.080 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.110  ‐‐  ‐‐
SLV Steel 0.111 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.134  ‐‐  ‐‐
TTO Oil 0.078 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.117  ‐‐  ‐‐
TTO Steel 0.110 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.145  ‐‐  ‐‐
URY Oil 0.284 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.085 0.070 0.068
URY Steel 0.196 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.116 0.109 0.110
VEN Steel 0.137 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.125  ‐‐  ‐‐
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(c) Standard Deviation of Level of Real Import Prices 
Historical 
Regime
Dollar 
Peg
SDR Peg Euro Peg
Comm. 
Peg
CPI Target PPI Target
ARG Oil 0.760 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.482 0.654 0.591
ARG Steel 0.684 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.378 0.646 0.567
BOL Oil 0.520 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.277 0.539 0.574
BOL Steel 0.483 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.435 0.523 0.452
BRA Oil 0.549 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.374  ‐‐  ‐‐
CHL Oil 0.601 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.597 0.771 0.578
CHL Steel 0.478 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.345 0.817 0.677
COL Steel 0.368 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.538 1.193 1.073
CRI Oil 0.568 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.484  ‐‐  ‐‐
CRI Steel 0.330 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.405  ‐‐  ‐‐
ECU Steel 0.393 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.538  ‐‐  ‐‐
GTM Oil 0.416 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.765  ‐‐  ‐‐
GTM Steel 0.368 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.669  ‐‐  ‐‐
GUY Oil 1.021 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.766  ‐‐  ‐‐
GUY Steel 0.970 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.581  ‐‐  ‐‐
HND Oil 0.471 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.765  ‐‐  ‐‐
HND Steel 0.398 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.669  ‐‐  ‐‐
JAM Oil 0.405 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.424 0.518 0.400
MEX Steel 0.387 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.000 1.050 1.094
NIC Oil 0.539 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.677  ‐‐  ‐‐
NIC Steel 0.467 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.529  ‐‐  ‐‐
PAN Oil 0.413 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.411  ‐‐  ‐‐
PAN Steel 0.370 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.388  ‐‐  ‐‐
PER Oil 0.480 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.342 0.403 0.424
PER Steel 0.385 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.307 0.464 0.458
PRY Oil 0.514 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.625 0.792 0.718
PRY Steel 0.469 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.444 0.803 0.613
SLV Oil 0.555 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.765  ‐‐  ‐‐
SLV Steel 0.572 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.669  ‐‐  ‐‐
TTO Oil 0.410 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.358  ‐‐  ‐‐
TTO Steel 0.408 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.478  ‐‐  ‐‐
URY Oil 0.515 0.485 0.482 0.490 0.625 0.693 0.639
URY Steel 0.482 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.444 0.562 0.408
VEN Steel 0.441 0.380 0.359 0.315 0.538  ‐‐  ‐‐
Real Import Prices
  
* Commodity peg refers to regime where the country's exchange rate is pegged to the price of the leading 
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Table 6: Average of the Variability of Export's and Import's Prices*  
(a)  Average of the Standard Deviation of Level of Nominal Prices 
 
* Average of leading commodity export standard deviation and oil price standard 
deviation under different regimes. 
 
Historical 
Regime 
Dollar 
Peg  SDR Peg Euro Peg Comm. 
Peg
CPI 
Target
PPI 
Target
ARG  2.084 0.519 0.474 0.444 0.324 1.078 0.888
BOL 1.968 0.693 0.644 0.609 0.179 0.839 0.621
BRA  2.265 0.675 0.596 0.520 0.269 ‐‐ ‐‐
CHL 3.407 0.584 0.519 0.467 0.298 0.942 0.765
COL  2.315 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.000 1.123 0.974
CRI  2.036 0.600 0.534 0.464 0.242 ‐‐ ‐‐
ECU  3.288 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.000 ‐‐ ‐‐
GTM  1.177 0.619 0.595 0.563 0.383 ‐‐ ‐‐
GUY  2.261 0.617 0.565 0.529 0.383 ‐‐ ‐‐
HND  1.237 0.619 0.595 0.563 0.383 ‐‐ ‐‐
JAM  2.083 0.588 0.529 0.463 0.226 1.148 0.671
MEX  3.238 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.000 0.975 1.030
NIC 2.287 0.619 0.595 0.563 0.383 ‐‐ ‐‐
PAN 0.600 0.600 0.534 0.464 0.242 ‐‐ ‐‐
PER  2.019 0.584 0.519 0.467 0.298 0.732 0.703
PRY  1.836 0.495 0.451 0.423 0.312 0.743 0.716
SLV  0.911 0.619 0.595 0.563 0.383 ‐‐ ‐‐
TTO  1.009 0.693 0.644 0.609 0.179 ‐‐ ‐‐
URY  3.804 0.495 0.451 0.423 0.312 0.793 0.525
VEN  2.931 0.759 0.697 0.623 0.000 ‐‐ ‐‐
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(b) Standard Deviation of First Difference of Nominal Prices:  
Export Price Standard Deviation and Import Price Standard Deviation Averaged 
Historical 
Regime
Dollar 
Peg
SDR Peg Euro Peg
Comm. 
Peg
CPI 
Target
PPI 
Target
ARG 0.199 0.071 0.072 0.076 0.049 0.059 0.058
BOL 0.317 0.090 0.090 0.093 0.092 0.154 0.104
BRA 0.145 0.082 0.083 0.087 0.056  ‐‐  ‐‐
CHL 0.123 0.076 0.076 0.079 0.049 0.066 0.061
COL 0.078 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.000 0.067 0.059
CRI 0.123 0.114 0.116 0.119 0.087  ‐‐  ‐‐
ECU 0.089 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
GTM 0.089 0.079 0.080 0.085 0.055  ‐‐  ‐‐
GUY 0.123 0.090 0.090 0.094 0.062  ‐‐  ‐‐
HND 0.106 0.079 0.080 0.085 0.055  ‐‐  ‐‐
JAM 0.075 0.062 0.064 0.069 0.039 0.056 0.049
MEX 0.090 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.000 0.064 0.067
NIC 0.183 0.079 0.080 0.085 0.055  ‐‐  ‐‐
PAN 0.114 0.114 0.116 0.119 0.087  ‐‐  ‐‐
PER 0.180 0.076 0.076 0.079 0.049 0.072 0.081
PRY 0.076 0.059 0.061 0.067 0.043 0.047 0.058
SLV 0.088 0.079 0.080 0.085 0.055  ‐‐  ‐‐
TTO 0.093 0.090 0.090 0.093 0.058  ‐‐  ‐‐
URY 0.180 0.059 0.061 0.067 0.043 0.049 0.045
VEN 0.116 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.000  ‐‐  ‐‐
First Difference of Nominal Prices
  
 
* Average of leading commodity export price standard deviation and oil price standard deviation under 
different regimes.   42
(c) Standard Deviation of Level of Real Prices  
Export Price Standard Deviation and Import Price Standard Deviation Averaged 
 
 
 
* Average of leading commodity export standard deviation and oil price standard deviation under 
different regimes. 
 
** Minimum standard deviation across alternative regimes is shown in bold. 
Historical 
Regime 
Dollar 
Peg SDR Peg  Euro PegComm. 
Peg
CPI 
Target
PPI 
Target
ARG  0.661  0.491 0.503 0.486 0.241 0.756 0.679
BOL  0.538  0.443 0.457 0.486 0.138 0.488 0.448
BRA  0.522  0.456 0.442 0.426 0.187 ‐‐ ‐‐
CHL  0.510  0.485 0.489 0.470 0.298 0.840 0.696
COL  0.456  0.485 0.482 0.490 0.000 1.123 0.974
CRI  0.420  0.368 0.383 0.385 0.242 ‐‐ ‐‐
ECU  0.456  0.485 0.482 0.490 0.000 ‐‐ ‐‐
GTM  0.510  0.588 0.600 0.585 0.383 ‐‐ ‐‐
GUY  0.922  0.581 0.579 0.557 0.383 ‐‐ ‐‐
HND  0.533  0.588 0.600 0.585 0.383 ‐‐ ‐‐
JAM  0.338  0.383 0.401 0.403 0.212 0.870 0.483
MEX  0.479  0.485 0.482 0.490 0.000 0.975 1.030
NIC  0.511  0.588 0.600 0.585 0.339 ‐‐ ‐‐
PAN  0.312  0.368 0.383 0.385 0.206 ‐‐ ‐‐
PER  0.444  0.485 0.489 0.470 0.171 0.420 0.429
PRY  0.413  0.455 0.475 0.466 0.312 0.743 0.716
SLV  0.750  0.588 0.600 0.585 0.383 ‐‐ ‐‐
TTO  0.383  0.443 0.457 0.486 0.179 ‐‐ ‐‐
URY  0.504  0.455 0.475 0.466 0.312 0.793 0.525
VEN  0.429  0.485 0.482 0.490 0.000 ‐‐ ‐‐
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Appendix 1: Volatilities of terms of trade, export prices and import prices 
 
RANK BY VOLATILITY            Standard     deviation    of   log   of  price  indices 
Country / Region 
 
Terms of Trade    
(as reported by EIU) 
 
 
Calculated 
Terms of 
Trade 
Export Price 
Index in US$ 
 
Import Price 
Index in US$ 
 
Libya  0.9043  1.1917  1.0280  0.1731 
Expanded Mercosur  0.7432  0.7431  0.2748  0.7886 
Dominican Republic  0.5700  0.0722  0.1187  0.4122 
Chile  0.5375  0.5375  0.3261  0.2384 
Venezuela  0.5118  0.5219  0.5448  0.0972 
Iran  0.4786  0.4786  0.4482  0.3037 
Nigeria  0.4538  0.4526  0.6003  0.2613 
Arabian Peninsula  0.4381  0.4385  0.4439  0.2432 
Oil Exporters (e  0.4350  0.4348  0.4904  0.2190 
Honduras  0.4341  0.4342  0.1564  0.4769 
Algeria  0.4326  0.4282  0.5326  0.3426 
Papua New Guinea  0.4300  0.4259  0.4005  0.2758 
Kuwait  0.4174  0.4202  0.5031  0.1793 
Uganda  0.4162  0.4161  0.2750  0.4002 
Latin America  0.4066  0.4067  0.2101  0.3728 
All Arab countries  0.3713  0.3715  0.4554  0.1577 
Russia  0.3501  0.3443  0.4212  0.2448 
Gabon  0.3397  0.3399  0.5386  0.4112 
Norway  0.3379  0.3379  0.4032  0.1531 
Kenya  0.3347  0.3458  0.3970  0.3698 
Paraguay  0.3333  0.3333  0.2447  0.2607 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.3113  0.3111  0.4099  0.2269 
Jamaica  0.3080  0.3080  0.1791  0.4554 
North Africa  0.3070  0.3071  0.4921  0.2412 
Middle East and  0.2905  0.2906  0.3598  0.2460 
MENA (excl Iraq)  0.2905  0.2906  0.3598  0.2460 
Zambia  0.2905  0.2904  0.4921  0.5817 
Main CIS  0.2846  0.2847  0.4371  0.2560 
Ecuador  0.2712  0.2369  0.4454  0.4203 
Cameroon  0.2705  0.2705  0.3768  0.2456 
Syria  0.2685  0.3154  0.5011  0.3624 
Ghana  0.2644  0.3319  0.3980  0.5687 
Nicaragua  0.2555  0.2617  0.2073  0.2020 
Zimbabwe  0.2553  0.2553  0.2933  0.3116   44
South Korea  0.2552  0.2553  0.1581  0.1947 
Oman  0.2495  0.2493  0.3582  0.1539 
Pakistan  0.2484  0.2458  0.0976  0.2896 
Tanzania  0.2475  0.2313  0.4305  0.2615 
Sudan  0.2392  0.2405  0.4572  0.2875 
Ethiopia  0.2198  0.2729  0.1887  0.1338 
Myanmar  0.2186  0.2189  0.3543  0.3879 
Japan  0.2169  0.2169  0.2676  0.1594 
Namibia  0.2140  0.2156  0.2483  0.3446 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.2130  0.2096  0.2589  0.2772 
Mexico  0.2077  0.1833  0.2018  0.1861 
Egypt  0.2066  0.1938  0.3127  0.3873 
Moldova  0.2042  0.2041  0.1720  0.2834 
Serbia  0.1942  0.1852  0.5102  0.3295 
Uruguay  0.1917  0.1914  0.2517  0.4059 
Guatemala  0.1831  0.1830  0.1850  0.2329 
Malawi  0.1819  0.1782  0.5443  0.5042 
Spain  0.1768  0.1786  0.2374  0.1448 
India  0.1681  0.1490  0.1836  0.1461 
Andean Community  0.1673  0.1674  0.2901  0.1408 
Central America  0.1655  0.1653  0.0955  0.2429 
Colombia  0.1591  0.1562  0.5637  0.5237 
Botswana  0.1564  0.1388  0.3098  0.3310 
Panama  0.1548  0.1552  0.0941  0.2232 
Yemen  0.1510  0.1511  0.4534  0.3828 
Baltics  0.1510  0.1511  0.3142  0.2234 
Mercosur  0.1491  0.1490  0.2997  0.2535 
Brazil  0.1480  0.1496  0.4323  0.5080 
Jordan  0.1480  0.1480  0.3591  0.4038 
Argentina  0.1440  0.1437  0.1758  0.0771 
Peru  0.1437  0.1475  0.4202  0.3037 
Senegal  0.1429  0.1429  0.3183  0.2657 
Taiwan  0.1398  0.1418  0.1004  0.1321 
Singapore  0.1365  0.1344  0.1238  0.1548 
Sub‐Saharan Africa  0.1361  0.1361  0.3166  0.2208 
Lithuania  0.1306  0.1306  0.2974  0.2454 
El Salvador  0.1296  0.0887  0.0733  0.1275 
Thailand  0.1282  0.1186  0.1998  0.2791 
Mauritius  0.1277  0.1277  0.1978  0.2088 
Australia  0.1258  0.1001  0.2004  0.1456 
Sweden  0.1254  0.1272  0.1624  0.1801   45
Sri Lanka  0.1228  0.1227  0.8377  0.7748 
Kazakhstan  0.1178  0.1207  0.6766  0.6402 
Economies in transition  0.1140  0.1140  0.3150  0.2270 
Economies in Tra  0.1140  0.1138  0.3191  0.2300 
Turkey  0.1082  0.1093  0.1564  0.1885 
China  0.1052  0.1053  0.5816  0.5039 
Indonesia  0.1037  0.1041  0.2339  0.2256 
New Zealand  0.0989  0.0974  0.2270  0.1386 
Costa Rica  0.0984  0.1026  0.0766  0.1571 
Morocco  0.0983  0.0983  0.2606  0.2717 
Germany  0.0963  0.0984  0.1953  0.1587 
Macedonia  0.0926  0.0958  0.1924  0.2418 
Finland  0.0913  0.1142  0.1502  0.2162 
Seychelles  0.0912  0.1183  0.1708  0.1251 
Italy  0.0896  0.0932  0.4204  0.3497 
Vietnam  0.0885  0.0896  0.1923  0.1479 
Tunisia  0.0880  0.0848  0.2499  0.3015 
Romania  0.0880  0.0846  0.2619  0.2078 
Greece  0.0874  0.0969  0.6973  0.7781 
Non‐OECD  0.0868  0.0868  0.1889  0.1812 
Australasia  0.0868  0.0869  0.2003  0.1420 
Philippines  0.0857  0.0840  0.2446  0.1969 
Latvia  0.0819  0.0818  0.2485  0.2146 
South Asia  0.0812  0.0813  0.2058  0.1906 
Croatia  0.0795  0.0795  0.2494  0.2525 
Portugal  0.0759  0.0755  0.4695  0.4062 
Scandinavia  0.0737  0.0737  0.1849  0.1444 
Asia & Australia  0.0732  0.0732  0.1753  0.1493 
Canada  0.0731  0.0732  0.1745  0.1090 
Switzerland  0.0713  0.0778  0.2521  0.1986 
South Africa  0.0699  0.0631  0.2357  0.1928 
Israel  0.0690  0.0653  0.2126  0.1713 
Bangladesh  0.0685  0.0726  0.0918  0.1603 
Southern Europe  0.0684  0.0682  0.2439  0.1950 
Cyprus  0.0661  0.0261  0.2114  0.2219 
Malaysia  0.0649  0.0641  0.1254  0.0715 
Ireland  0.0638  0.0629  0.1797  0.2179 
Poland  0.0628  0.0616  0.2236  0.1962 
Main SADC  0.0612  0.0611  0.2214  0.1878 
G7  0.0609  0.0608  0.1812  0.1450 
Eastn. Mediterranean  0.0602  0.0603  0.2241  0.1825   46
Main SACU  0.0600  0.0599  0.2335  0.2014 
G10  0.0594  0.0593  0.1861  0.1516 
Euro Area  0.0584  0.0584  0.2122  0.1796 
Big Four  0.0583  0.0586  0.2005  0.1632 
Iceland  0.0578  0.0568  0.2960  0.3094 
Western Europe  0.0541  0.0542  0.2068  0.1714 
ASEAN  0.0534  0.0535  0.1285  0.1612 
Western Europe (  0.0534  0.0536  0.2084  0.1722 
Balkans  0.0530  0.0530  0.2990  0.2571 
Asia & Australia  0.0525  0.0526  0.1390  0.1672 
European Union  0.0519  0.0517  0.2047  0.1733 
EU27  0.0509  0.0510  0.2056  0.1749 
Non‐Oil Exporter  0.0499  0.0498  0.2845  0.2864 
OECD  0.0497  0.0495  0.1844  0.1565 
Hungary  0.0486  0.0497  0.1273  0.1633 
Bulgaria  0.0483  0.0504  0.3806  0.3976 
France  0.0482  0.0487  0.1642  0.1340 
Greater China  0.0462  0.0461  0.2284  0.2093 
Belgium  0.0453  0.0447  0.4123  0.4082 
United States  0.0421  0.0421  0.1120  0.1489 
Denmark  0.0409  0.0423  0.2387  0.2058 
World  0.0403  0.0403  0.1880  0.1569 
Netherlands  0.0361  0.0379  0.1424  0.1424 
Slovakia  0.0317  0.0317  0.2387  0.2645 
NAFTA  0.0253  0.0252  0.1296  0.1425 
Czech Republic  0.0252  0.0224  0.2508  0.2421 
Austria  0.0244  0.0253  0.4330  0.4485 
United Kingdom  0.0234  0.0241  0.1832  0.1770 
North America  0.0210  0.0209  0.1248  0.1391 
Slovenia  0.0208  0.0199  0.5206  0.5257 
Hong Kong  0.0181  0.0184  0.0852  0.0871 
Eastern Europe  0.0170  0.0169  0.2466  0.2348 
East‐central Europe  0.0115  0.0115  0.2212  0.2161 
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Appendix 2: Each Candidate for Nominal Anchor has its Own 
Vulnerability 
 
CPI targeting is not unique in having an Achilles heel, in the form of import price 
shocks.   Other standard candidates for nominal anchor have their own problems.   Table 
A1 summarizes how each of the variables that are candidates for nominal anchor has its 
own characteristic sort of extraneous fluctuations that can wreck havoc on a country’s 
monetary system.   
 
Table A1: Six proposed nominal anchors and the Achilles heel of each 
 
Regime Targeted 
nominal variable 
Vulnerability Historical  Examples 
      
Inflation 
targeting 
CPI 
 
Import price shocks  Oil shocks of 1973, 1980, 
2000, 2008 
Monetarist 
rule 
M1 Velocity  shocks  US  1982 
Gold standard  Price of gold  Vagaries of world gold 
market 
1849 boom; 
1873-96 bust 
Commodity 
standard 
Price of 
commodity 
basket 
Shocks in market for 
imported 
commodity 
Oil shocks of 1973, 1980, 
2000, 2008 
Nominal 
income 
targeting 
Nominal GDP  Measurement problems  Less developed countries 
Fixed 
exchange rate 
$  
(or euro) 
Appreciation of $  
(or euro) 
1995-2001 
(or 2003-07 for the euro) 
 
•  A monetarist rule would specify a fixed rate of growth in the money supply.  But 
fluctuations in the public’s demand for money or in the behavior of the banking 
system can directly produce gratuitous fluctuations in velocity and the interest rate, 
and thereby in the real economy. For example, in the United States, a large upward 
shift in the demand for money around 1982 convinced the Federal Reserve Board that 
it had better abandon the money growth rule it had adopted two years earlier, or else 
face a prolonged and severe recession.   
 
•  Under a gold standard, the economy is hostage to the vagaries of the world gold 
market.   For example, when much of the world was on the gold standard in the 19th 
century, global monetary conditions depended on the output of the world’s gold 
mines.   The California gold rush from 1849 was associated with a mid-century 
increase in liquidity and a resulting increase in the global price level.  The absence of   48
major discoveries of gold between 1873 and 1896 helps explain why price levels fell 
dramatically over this period.  In the late 1890s, the gold rushes in Alaska and South 
Africa were each again followed by new upswings in the price level.   Thus the 
system did not in fact guarantee stability.
42 
 
•  One proposal is that monetary policy should target a basket of basic mineral and 
agricultural commodities. The idea is that a broad-based commodity standard of this 
sort would not be subject to the vicissitudes of a single commodity such as gold, 
because fluctuations of its components would average out somewhat.
43   The proposal 
might work if the basket reflected the commodities produced and exported by the 
country in question.  But for a country that is a net importer of oil, wheat, and other 
mineral and agricultural commodities, such a peg gives precisely the wrong answer in 
a year when the prices of these import commodities go up.   Just when the domestic 
currency should be depreciating to accommodate an adverse movement in the terms 
of trade, it appreciates instead.  Chile should not peg to oil, and Trinidad should not 
peg to wheat. 
 
•  The need for robustness with respect to import price shocks argues for the superiority 
of nominal income targeting over inflation targeting.
44  Nominal income targeting is 
a regime that has the desirable property of taking supply shocks partly as P and partly 
as Y, without forcing the central bank to abandon the declared nominal anchor.    
Some argue that the measurement of GDP is too subject to lags and revisions.     In 
any case, for some reason, nominal income targeting has not been seriously 
considered since the 1990s, either by rich or poor countries.  Thus it is not analyzed in 
this paper.    
 
•  Under a fixed exchange rate, fluctuations in the value of the particular currency to 
which the home country is pegged can produce needless volatility in the country’s 
international price competitiveness.  For example, the appreciation of the dollar from 
1995 and 2001 was also an appreciation for whatever currencies were linked to the 
dollar.  Regardless the extent to which one considers the late-1990s dollar 
appreciation to have been based in the fundamentals of the US economy, there was no 
necessary connection to the fundamentals of smaller dollar-linked economies.  The 
problem was particularly severe for some far-flung economies that had adopted 
currency boards over the preceding decade: Hong Kong, Argentina, and Lithuania.    
 
  Dollar-induced overvaluation was also one of the problems facing such victims of 
currency crisis as Mexico (1994), Thailand and Korea (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil 
(1999) and Turkey (2001), even though none of these countries had formal rigid links to 
the dollar.  It is enough for the dollar to exert a large pull on the country’s currency to 
                                                 
42 Cooper (1985), Eichengrenn (1985) or Hall (1982).   
 
44 Velocity shocks argue for the superiority of nominal income targeting over a monetarist rule. ).  Frankel 
(1995) demonstrates the point mathematically, using the framework of Rogoff (1985).   The proposal was 
popular among macroeconomists in the 1980s:  Bean (1983); Feldstein and Stock (1994); Taylor (1985); 
Tobin (1980); West (1986).   49
create strains.  The loss of competitiveness in non-dollar export markets adversely 
impacts such measures of economic health as real overvaluation, exports, the trade 
balance, and growth, or such measures of financial health as the ratios of current account 
to GDP, debt to GDP, debt service to exports, or reserves to imports.   
 
•  This brings us back to the current fashion of targeting the inflation rate or CPI.  To 
some, PEP may sound similar to inflation targeting. But, as already noted, a key 
difference between the CPI and the export price is the terms of trade.  When there is 
an adverse movement in the terms of trade, one would like the currency to depreciate, 
while price level targeting can have the opposite implication.  If the central bank has 
been constrained to hit an inflation target, oil price shocks (as in 1973, 1979, 2000, or 
2008), for example, will require an oil-importing country to tighten monetary policy.  
The result can be sharp falls in national output.  Thus under rigid inflation targeting, 
supply or terms-of-trade shocks can produce unnecessary and excessive fluctuations 
in the level of economic activity.    
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Targeting the Export Price vs. Exchange Rate and CPI, in a 
Simple Theoretical Model 
   
Section 4 of the paper presented a simple model with five shocks, designed to 
compare the stabilizing properties of three alternative nominal targets:   an export price 
index, the CPI, and the exchange rate.   The following table reports the value of the 
objective function under each of the three regimes, in terms of the relative variability of 
the five shocks    The details of the derivation are omitted to save space. 
 
 
  Table 
A2b 
Objective:   Stabilize CPI and output in the NTG and X sectors 
 Coefficient 
on: 
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Appendix 4: Data Sources and Computation Methods 
 
Data Sources 
 
Variable Source
Commodity Prices International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Global Financial Statistics (GFS)
Composition of commodity exports World Bank analysis
Exports IFS
Imports IFS
Export Price Index IFS
Consumer Price Index (CPI) IFS
Producer Price Index (PPI) IFS, Countries' National Statistical Institute and Central Bank
Wholesale Price Index (WPI) IFS, Countries' National Statistical Institute and Central Bank
Exchange Rates IFS
CPI detailed decomposition Countries' National Statistical Institute
PPI detailed decomposition Countries' National Statistical Institute
Non Tradables CPI Countries' Central Bank
Tradables CPI Countries' Central Bank  
 
 
Computation Methods 
 
1.  Simulation of Export Prices 
 
A profit-maximizing firm that is competitive in its product and input markets will produce in 
relation to the ratio of the price of the export good to the price of its variable inputs. If its 
production is for simplicity taken to be Cobb-Douglas, with labor the only variable factor of 
production, then in logs we have                            ) ( w p x LogX x − + = σ  
 
where px is the log of the domestic currency price of the export good in question, w is the log of 
the wage in local currency, and σ the supply elasticity depends on labor’s share.   
$ $
lc x x s p p − =  
Where  p
$
x  is the log dollar price of the export good on world markets, which fluctuates 
exogenously; and 
s
$
lc is the log dollar value of the local currency, which depends both on the country’s exchange 
rate policy  and fluctuations in the dollar’s value. 
 
A country can get into trouble under a regime where s
$
lc is fixed, because a decline in p$x hurts 
exports in proportionσ . (In dollar terms, which may be the most relevant measure if a country 
has incurred debts in dollars, the loss of export revenue is (1+ σ ) times the fall in p
$
x.) But the 
country can also get into trouble if the exchange rate s
$
lc floats, and thereby introduces its own 
extraneous fluctuations into the equation. 
 
Assume that w is stable, a prospect that is more likely if expected inflation has been secured by 
means of one or another nominal anchor for monetary policy. Then to determine exports, whether 
in real terms or dollar terms, we want to focus on:          
$ $
lc x x s p p − =  
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The way to do that is to set the dollar price of the domestic currency equal to the dollar price of 
the export commodity:                                                  
$ $
lc x s p =  
 
Operationally, this is the way to implement a commitment to peg the domestic price of the export 
commodity. Intuitively, by removing fluctuations in px, we may stabilize exports. (In the 
simulations, we focus on how various regimes would affect px-w, where we represent the 
domestic cost of variable inputs, w, by the domestic CPI). 
 
To repeat from above, the key variable is px-w, the price of exports relative to the cost of variable 
inputs, which could be defined as the real exchange rate. The path under the seven possible 
regimes is calculated as follows: 
 
Under actual history, 
$
$ x
lc
x P S P =  and w = CPI
lc . 
Under a hypothetical dollar peg,  1 $ =
lc S , so 
$
x x P P =  and w = CPI
US. 
Under a hypothetical DM or euro peg 
45, 
DM lc S S $ $ = , so 
$
$ x
DM
x P S P =  and w = CPI
G. 
Under a hypothetical SDR, 
SDR lc S S $ $ = , so 
$
$ x
SDR
x P S P =  and w = CPI
SDR.
46 
Under a hypothetical commodity peg, 
x lc P S $ $ = , so 1 = x P  and w = 1. 
Under a hypothetical CPI target
47,  ) /( ) 100 ( $ $ $ $ otg otg pm pm cx cx ntg ntg
lc P w P w P w P w S + + − = , 
$
$ x
lc
x P S P =  . 
Under a hypothetical PPI target
48,  ) /( ) 100 ( $ $ $ $ otg otg pm pm cx cx ntg ntg
lc P v P v P v P v S + + − = ,   
$
$ x
lc
x P S P =  . 
 
Under the CPI and PPI target, we have approximated non tradable goods’ prices using a 10-year 
moving average of the US CPI (assuming the target was implemented credibly since the start of 
the period under analysis).  
 
We use the CPI to measure the price of variable inputs, w. When the currency is hypothetically 
taken to be rigidly pegged to the dollar, SDR, or DM, then CPIHome is taken to be the CPI of the 
US, SDR, or Germany, respectively, under the assumption that the peg is strong enough and 
permanent enough to achieve convergence of inflation rates
49.  
 
The path of the real price of commodities under the seven possible regimes is calculated as 
follows: 
 
Under actual history,  lc x
lc
x CPI P S RP /
$
$ =  
                                                 
45 The exchange rate of the German Mark after 1999 is calculated as follows. 
S(DM/$) in 1999 = S(Euro/$) in 1999 * S(DM/Euro) in 1999; 
S(DM/$) in 2000 = S(DM/$) in 1999 * (1 + % change of the euro exchange rate). 
46 The CPI for the SDR peg is constructed as a weighted average of USA CPI, UK CPI, France CPI and 
Germany CPI. To calculate this average we use the weight of each country’s currency in the SDR. 
47  Rewrite the CPI equation from part 2. of this appendix as: CPI = wntg Pntg +wcx S Pcx$ + wpm S Ppm$  
+ wotg S Potg$ and solve for the exchange rate that maintains CPI constant. 
48  Rewrite the PPI equation from part 2. of this appendix as: PPI = vntg Pntg +vcx S Pcx$ + vpm S Ppm$  
+ votg S Potg$ and solve for the exchange rate that maintains PPI constant. 
49 When calculating the real exchange rate for the euro, we continue to use the German CPI.   52
Under a hypothetical dollar peg,  ) )( / ( $
$ K CPI P RP US x x =  
Under a hypothetical SDR peg,  ) )( / (
$
$ SDR SDR x
SDR
x K CPI P S RP =  
Under a hypothetical DM or euro peg,  ) )( / (
$
$ DM G x
DM
x K CPI P S RP =   
Under a hypothetical commodity peg,  x x K RP =  
Under a hypothetical CPI target,   ) )( (
$
$ CPI x
lc
x K P S RP =  
Under a hypothetical PPI target,   ) )( (
$
$ PPI x
lc
x K P S RP =    
 
Where K$ , KSDR , KDM , Kx , KCPI and KPPI are constants calculated so as to make the log of the real 
price of the commodity on average over the 30 year period equal under each of the regimes to 
what it was in actual history. 
We simulated import prices for LAC countries using this same methodology; instead of using the 
price of the leading commodity export in dollars we used the most important import prices in 
dollar terms as can be seen in tables 5a. 
2.  Simulation of CPI and PPI 
To simulate the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Producer Price Index (PPI) under different 
regimes we impose the following equations. 
 
otg otg pm pm cx wcx ntg ntg
otg otg pm pm cx wcx ntg ntg
P v P v P v P v PPI
P w P w P w P w CPI
+ + + =
+ + + =
 
 
where: 
 
Pntg ≡ Price of non-traded goods in local terms. We assume that, at a horizon of less than 1 year, 
these prices would not be affected by differences in the exchange rate. Under the hypothetical 
counterfactual where a country would have been on a dollar peg all along, then its non tradable 
prices are given by the US CPI, since we assume that convergence would have taken place in the 
long run. 
Pcx ≡ Price of exports of leading mineral/agricultural commodity in local terms (we ignore trade 
barriers and define these tradable goods prices to equal the actual historically observed world 
dollar prices, times the exchange rate, which will differ depending on the regime assumed. 
Pox ≡ Price of other exports, which we approximate using Ppm ≡ Price of petroleum product 
imports. This is determined again as actual world dollar price times the simulated exchange rate.    
Potg ≡  Price of other tradable goods (i.e., excluding oil and the other commodities that are 
measured explicitly).  Assume equal to world prices of the tradable goods times the exchange 
rate.   
 
wntg  ≡ weight on ntg in CPI    wcx   ≡ weight on cx in CPI   
wpm ≡ weight on pm in CPI    wotg ≡ weight on otg in CPI   
vntg  ≡ weight on ntg in PPI    vcx   ≡ weight on cx in PPI   
vpm ≡ weight on pm in PPI    votg ≡ weight on otg in PPI  . 
 
We impose wntg  ≡ vntg   
 
To estimate the above mentioned weights, we followed these steps:   53
 
a.  Obtain countries’ Non Tradable CPI and Tradable CPI series. 
b.  Regress CPI against Non Tradable CPI to get wntg = vntg.   
c.  Obtain detailed decomposition of CPI and PPI, and calculate weight of leading 
commodity export (wcx and vcx) and weight of oil in CPI and PPI (wpm and vpm). 
d.  Calculate weight of other tradable goods as the complement (i.e., 1 -  wcx - wntg - wpm).    54
Appendix 5: Nominal and Real Log Export Prices, Simulated under 
alternative regimes 
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* Basket: Iron Ore, Steel scrap, oil and sugar.   56
‐10
‐8
‐6
‐4
‐2
0
2
4
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Brazil, Nominal Export Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
‐1.5
‐1
‐0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Brazil, Real Export Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
 
 
 
Chile 
 
‐10
‐8
‐6
‐4
‐2
0
2
4
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Chile, Nominal Copper Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
CPI Target
PPI Target
‐5.5
‐3.5
‐1.5
0.5
2.5
4.5
6.5
8.5
10.5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Chile, Real Copper Price
(in log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
Comm Peg
CPI Target
PPI Target
 
 
Colombia 
 
‐5
‐4
‐3
‐2
‐1
0
1
2
3
4
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Colombia, Nominal Oil Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic 
regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
CPI Target
PPI Target
‐5.00
‐4.00
‐3.00
‐2.00
‐1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Colombia, Real Oil Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic 
regime
Dollar 
Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
Comm 
Peg
CPI 
Target
PPI 
Target
 
   57
‐4
‐3
‐2
‐1
0
1
2
3
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Colombia,  Nominal Coffee Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
‐2.00
‐1.50
‐1.00
‐0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Colombia, Real Coffee Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
 
 
‐1.2
‐1
‐0.8
‐0.6
‐0.4
‐0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Colombia, Nominal Export Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
‐0.30
‐0.20
‐0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Colombia, Real Export Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
 
 
 
Costa Rica 
 
‐4
‐3
‐2
‐1
0
1
2
3
4
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Costa rica, Nominal Bananas Price
(in log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
‐1.50
‐1.00
‐0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Costa Rica, Real Bananas Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
 
   58
‐4
‐3
‐2
‐1
0
1
2
3
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Costa rica, Nominal Coffee Price
(in log, mean substracted)
Historic 
regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
‐2.00
‐1.50
‐1.00
‐0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Costa Rica, Real Coffee Price
(in log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
 
 
 
 
 
Ecuador 
 
‐6
‐4
‐2
0
2
4
6
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Ecuador, Nominal Oil Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
‐1.50
‐1.00
‐0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Ecuador, Real Oil Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
 
 
‐6
‐4
‐2
0
2
4
6
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Ecuador, Nominal Export Price
(in log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg ‐1.00
‐0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Ecuador, Real Export Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
   59
El Salvador 
 
‐2
‐1.5
‐1
‐0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
El Salvador, Nominal Coffee Price
(in natural log, mean substracted) 
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
‐2.00
‐1.50
‐1.00
‐0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
El Salvador, Real Coffee Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
 
 
 
Guatemala 
 
‐2
‐1.5
‐1
‐0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Guatemala, Nominal Coffee Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
‐2.00
‐1.50
‐1.00
‐0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Guatemala, Real Coffee Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
 
 
 
Guyana 
 
‐4
‐3
‐2
‐1
0
1
2
3
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Guyana, Nominal Sugar Price
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Trinidad and Tobago 
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Trinidad and Tobago, Real Natural Gas Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
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Uruguay 
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Uruguay, Nominal Beef Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
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Uruguay, Real Beef Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
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Venezuela 
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Venezuela, Nominal Oil Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
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Venezuela, Real Oil Price
(in natural log, mean substracted)
Historic regime
Dollar Peg
SDR Peg
Euro Peg
 